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On so-called truncated clefts[*]
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1. Introduction

This paper is concerned with the kinds of copular clauses given in (1).

(1) a. It's Beverly.
       b. That was his father.
       c. It could have been me.
       d. That might be Adrian.

These are known as "truncated clefts" (or hidden or reduced clefts) in the literature, based on their similarity to the clefts in (2) (see Poutsma 1916: 732, Jespersen 1958: 149, Declerck 1988, Büring 1998, Hedberg 2000, Merchant 2001: 117-120, Ward et al. 2003, Birner et al. 2005 among others).

(2) a. It's Beverly that makes the best pies.
       b. That was his father that went to Hamburg.
       c. It could have been me that drove the car.
       d. That might be Adrian that's knocking on the door.

As these authors observe, the sentences in (1) and (2) are similar in both form and meaning. The truncated clefts in (1) look like the clefts in (2) minus the cleft clause, and in the right contexts, each of the sentences in (1) can be used with the meaning of the corresponding sentence in (2). Following a question like *Who went to Hamburg?,* (1b) can be used to convey what (2b) conveys, and following a knock on the door, (1d) can be used with the meaning of (2d).

   The issue that I will try to address here is how truncated clefts relate to the general taxonomy of copular clauses developed by Higgins (1979: 204-293) and assumed in much subsequent work on copular clauses. Truncated clefts have a number of characteristic properties (reviewed in section 2) and the question is to what extent these properties can be explained in terms of properties of any of the general classes of copular clauses in Higgins' taxonomy together with specific features of truncated clefts, specifically their subject

pronoun. One possibility – that is, in a sense, the null hypothesis – is that truncated clefts do not belong to any of the categories in the taxonomy and that they have to be recognized as a class in their own right. However, it is also possible that truncated clefts constitute a subclass of one of the four classes in the existing taxonomy. It is important to examine this possibility, since, if true, it would allow us to expand the empirical coverage of the taxonomy without expanding the taxonomy itself, as well as further our understanding of truncated clefts by explicating their relationship to other copular clauses.

Higgins (1979) distinguishes four classes of copular clauses: predicational clauses (3), specificational clauses (4), equative clauses (5), and identificational clauses (6):[1]

(3) a. Beverly is a fine baker.   [predicational]
    b. My neighbor is from Alabama.
    c. She is tired.

(4) a. The best pie-maker is Beverly.   [specificational]
    b. The one who went to Hamburg was his father.
    c. The driver could have been me.
    d. The person at the door might be Adrian.

(5) a. SHE is Beverly.   [equative]
    b. Cicero is Tully.

(6) a. That woman is Beverly.   [identificational]
    b. That is Beverly.

To my knowledge, no one has proposed that truncated clefts are predicational, and since I see no evidence for that position I will not discuss it further. Higgins (1979: 236-240) seems himself to consider truncated clefts identificational, grouping (6b) with (6a). In Mikkelsen (2004; 2005: 118-130) I argue that truncated clefts like (6b) do not form a natural class with sentences like (6a) and that (6b) should instead be classed with the specificational copular clauses in (4). The basic idea behind this proposal is that truncated clefts are specificational clauses with a pronominal subject, which implies that (6b) stands in the same relationship to (4a) that (7) does to (8):

(7) He left.
(8) Frank left.

In their studies of full and truncated clefts Ward et al. (2003) and Birner et al. (2005) argue that truncated clefts are a special kind of equative clause, i.e. they belong in (5). Finally, Büring (1998) proposes that truncated clefts are a kind of expletive construction, and hence not directly classifiable within Higgins' taxonomy, though his analysis shares elements with the equative analysis. I will not repeat the arguments against truncated clefts being identificational (see Mikkelsen 2005: 118-130), but will focus on detailing the

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[1] Higgins uses the term identity clause for (5), but the term equative is more widespread in the linguistic literature and I will therefore use it here.

specificational analysis of truncated clefts and comparing this to the equative and expletive analyses. My overall conclusion will be that while there are unresolved issues for a specificational analysis of truncated clefts, it is a promising line of analysis, and that the assumptions it makes about the subject pronouns of truncated clefts (*it* and *that*) are better supported than the ones made by either the equative or expletive analyses. Under the specificational analysis truncated clefts are neither clefts nor truncated, but simply monoclausal specificational copular clauses with a pronominal subject. I nonetheless use the term truncated cleft throughout for consistency with the literature. The reader is invited to supply mental scare quotes.

The idea that truncated clefts are specificational is not new. It is proposed by Declerck (1988), and noted in passing by Hedberg (2000: 901, fn. 17;907, fn. 22) and Geist (to appear: section 4.2). Here I adopt a specific syntactic and semantic understanding of specificational clauses – the one developed in Mikkelsen (2005) – and examine how far that gets us with accounting for the characteristic properties of truncated clefts. Making the specificational analysis more explicit also allows for a clearer comparison with the alternative analyses of truncated clefts mentioned above, though it should be kept in mind that there are competing syntactic and semantic analyses of specificational clauses (due to Heycock & Kroch 1999, Schlenker 2003, Romero 2005, Mueller-Reichau 2006 and others), each of which would make different sense of the claim that truncated clefts are specificational and some of which would not be incompatible with the equative analysis of Ward et al. (2003) and Birner et al. (2005). It should also be noted that I am only considering English truncated clefts in this paper. Many languages have copular clauses that seem very similar to English truncated clefts in form and/or function, but from the little I know about these structures in the various languages, they all differ in one way or another from the English construction examined here, with Danish as a possible exception (Mikkelsen 2005: 118-130). Matić's paper in this volume, provide an illuminating cross-linguistic perspective on specificational copular clauses, though he does not specifically discuss the truncated cleft variety. See also the discussion of Russian copular clauses in Geist (to appear).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I lay out the characteristic properties of truncated clefts. In section 3, I present the analysis of specificational clauses that I will assume, and in section 4, I examine how well it accounts for the properties of truncated clefts. The alternative analyses are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Properties of truncated clefts

Much of this section is based on Higgins (1979: 204-293), Declerck (1988), and Büring (1998), though I organize and present the data somewhat differently from these authors. In the first three subsections, I describe the restrictions on the three pieces of a truncated cleft: the subject, the verb, and the post-verbal element. In the last subsection, I discuss properties of the entire construction.

2.1 Restrictions on the subject

There is agreement in the literature that truncated clefts need to be distinguished from otherwise identical copular clauses with *she*, *he*, *I, you, we*, or *they* in subject position. (This distinction is the explicit starting point for the discussions in Declerck 1988 and Büring 1998.) There is less agreement that *It is DP* and *That is DP* should both be considered truncated clefts. Higgins (1979) only discusses *That is DP*, so it is unclear how he would classify *It is DP*. Ward et al. (2003) and Birner et al. (2005) also focus on the demonstrative version, but acknowledge the existence of the parallel *It is DP* construction, while leaving open whether their equative analysis extends to constructions with *it* as well (Birner et al. 2005: 8, 21 fn. 11). Büring (1998) only discusses *It is DP*, but notes (p. 52) that *That is DP* exhibits parallel behavior in many respects. Similarly, Declerck (1988) focusses on *It is DP*, but suggests (p. 238) that *that* may substitute for *it* in certain circumstances. In contrast, Hedberg (2000: 894-904) argues that the two should be grouped together as truncated clefts and that what distinguishes them is the restrictions placed by *it* and *that* on the givenness (in the sense of Gundel et al. 1993) of the content of the missing cleft clause. She shows that similar contextual factors govern the use of *it* vs. *that* in full clefts and ties it to the use of these items more generally. Given Hedberg's arguments and given that *It is DP* and *That is DP* exhibit parallel behavior in all the ways examined below, I will assume that the two do group together and, hence, that we should aim for a unified analysis.

2.2 Restrictions on the verb

Truncated clefts are found only with the copula verb *be*. The non-copular clauses in (9) are impossible as variations on the copular clauses in (10). As (11) shows the characteristic *it* and *that* can be found as the surface subject of non-copular verbs, but only as the result of raising from the subject position of an embedded non-finite copular clause.

(9) a. *It seems Beverly.
     b. *That appeared his father.
     c. *There is someone at the door and I wonder what it wants. [cf. Declerck 1988: 215]
     d. *It could become your new assistant.   [cf. Büring 1998: (33b')]

(10) a. It is Beverly.
     b. That was his father.
     c. There is a man in the kitchen and I wonder who it is.
     d. It could be your new assistant.

(11) a. It seems to be Beverly,
     b. That appeared to be his father.

2.3 Restrictions on the post-copular phrase

The post-copular phrase of a truncated cleft must be a DP. This is a little hard to show, because *it* and *that* can also occur as the subjects of predicational copular clauses with

non-DP complements, as in (12). These sentences differ from the truncated clefts in (10) in two respects: first, the sentences in (12) ascribe a property to an entity (heaviness in (12a)), whereas truncated clefts specify who bears a certain contextually salient property (Beverly in (10a)). Secondly, the sentences in (12) can only be used with reference to non-humans, which is not true for truncated clefts, as (10a-d) show (Higgins 1979: 237ff).

(12) a. It is [heavy].
 b. That is [from Sweden].

The sentences in (12) could be used to describe an inanimate object like a table, but to describe a person a non-neuter pronoun must be used, as in (13a-b).

(13) a. He is heavy.
 b. She is from Sweden.

As Higgins (1979: 239) observes, being nominal is not enough to qualify for the post-copular position; a determinerless NP is impossible in the post-copular position of the truncated clefts in (14), whereas the determiner may be left out in the copular clauses in (15).

(14) a. It is the mayor of Cambridge.
 b.*It is mayor of Cambridge.

(15) a. Beverly is the mayor of Cambridge.
  b. Beverly is mayor of Cambridge.

Furthermore, not all DPs can occupy the post-copular position in a truncated cleft. In particular, the post-copular DP cannot be quantificational (Declerck 1988: 230; though see Büring 1998: ex. (25) for a possible counterexample in German):[2]

(16) a. #It was many people.
 b. #That was every student.

In contrast, names, pronouns, definite and indefinite descriptions, possessives, and demonstrative descriptions are all possible in the post-copular position:

(17) [Who spotted the leak?]
 It was Frank/him/the neighbor/a neighbor/my sister/that guy.

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[2] Eric Potsdam (p.c. January 30, 2006) has brought various English examples to my attention that challenge this generalization, in particular examples where a (seemingly) quantificational DP is acceptable in the post-copular position of (what looks like) a truncated cleft, but not in the corresponding full cleft. Serious consideration of these must await another occasion, though see Declerck (1988: 240) for relevant observations.

Finally, if the post-copular element is a possessive, it presupposes existence and uniqueness, whereas these presuppositions may be lost in the corresponding copular clause with a non-neuter subject pronoun. This is brought out in (18) and (19), which are elaborations of examples in Higgins (1979: 266-7), who attributes the observation about the loss of uniqueness presuppositions to Jespersen (1924: 153).[3]

(18) A: Who is that?
      B1: That's Adrian's sister.
      B2: (I don't know, but) that's not Adrian's sister.

(19) A: How is Mary related to Adrian?
      B1: She's his sister.
      B2: (I don't know, but) she's not his sister.

The answers in (19) are compatible with Adrian having more than one sister (B1) or no sister (B2), whereas the answers in (18) both presuppose that Adrian has exactly one sister.[4]

2.4 Properties of the entire construction
There are three things to note about truncated clefts in their entirety. First, they can be used to answer questions of the form in (20), indicating that the post-copular element is the focus (it corresponds to the *wh*-phrase of the question):

(20) a. Who is the best pie-maker? It's Beverly.
      b. Who went to Hamburg? That was his father.

Second, reversing the order of the two DPs results in a markedly different meaning, infelicity, or even ungrammaticality (Higgins 1979: 239-240):

(21) a. Who is the best pie-maker? #Beverly is it.
      b. Who went to Hamburg? #Your father was that.

Third, whereas truncated clefts can generally be paraphrased by overt clefts, this is not possible when the cleft clause is of the form *who it/that is* or *who is that/it*:

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[3] Büring (1998: 50) makes a similar observation about the projection of existence presuppositions in modal contexts. Since my treatment is extensional throughout, I will not discuss this case here, nor the observations Büring makes about the relative scope of the post-verbal element with respect to an epistemic modal.

[4] The status of the contrast in (18) and (19) is far from clear. Several native speakers of American English, including John MacFarlane and Kenneth Easwaren, report a lack of contrast and the editors of this volume further suggest that the contrast is a purely pragmatic one, governed by context and not by semantic type. With these serious caveats in mind, I nonetheless include the data here for completeness and as a basis for further empirical investigation.

(22) a. Who is the best pie-maker? It is Beverly (who's the best piemaker).
    b.Who is it? It is Beverly (#who it is/#who is it).

(23) a. Who is going to Hamburg? That is his father (that's going to Hamburg).
    b. Who is that? That is his father (#who that is/#who is that).

Part of this last observation (that full clefts of the form *It's X who that is* are infelicitous) is made in Birner et al. (2005: 18). See also Declerck (1988: 230-231) and Merchant (2001: 117) for related observations.
    I take these to be the central properties that an analysis of truncated clefts should account for.

3. The predicate raising analysis of specificational clauses

In his influential 1997 book, Moro proposes that specificational clauses are derived from the same underlying structure as predicational clauses.[5] Thus the predicational clause in (24) and the specificational clause in (25) share the underlying structure in (26), in which the copula verb takes a small clause (SC) complement (see also Bowers 1993, 2001).

(24) Beverly is the best baker.
(25) The best baker is Beverly.
(26) is [$_{SC}$ Beverly the best baker]

The small clause consists of an initial referential element (*Beverly*) and a second predicative element (*the best baker*). The predicational clause is derived by raising the first element of the small clause to subject position (24'), whereas the specificational clause involves raising the second, predicative, element of the small clause to subject position (25') (hence the term `predicate raising' for this analysis of specificational clauses).

(24') [$_{IP}$ Beverly$_i$ is [t$_i$ the best baker]]
(26') [$_{IP}$ The best baker$_i$ is [Beverly t$_i$]]

In Mikkelsen (2005) I adopt the core of this analysis and extend it in two ways. Whereas Moro remains uncommitted about the internal structure of the small clause complement of the copula, I analyze it as the projection of a functional head, Pred, which takes a predicative XP as its complement and a referential XP as its specifier:

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[5] Moro uses the term `canonical copular clause' for predicational clauses and `inverse copular clause' for specificational clauses.

(27)

```
              PredP
            /      \
        DP_e       Pred'
      Beverly     /     \
               Pred    DP_<e,t>
                       /    \
                  the best baker
```

The selection and combination of these elements is governed by the semantic type of Pred, which is, in extensional terms, $<<e,t>,<e,t>>$. The Pred head does not contribute any semantic content beyond this: it simply passes the property-denotation of its sister on to be combined with the other contentful element of the small clause, namely the referential element in Spec-PredP. In a copular clause, PredP is the complement of the copula, which I analyze as an unaccusative light verb v_b. The projection of v_b is the complement of T, and Spec-TP is the subject position:

(27)

```
           TP
          /  \
             T'
            /  \
          T    v_bP
              /    \
            v_b    PredP
            be    /     \
               DP_e     Pred'
             Beverly    /    \
                     Pred   DP_<e,t>
                            /    \
                       the best baker
```

The highest verbal head, here v_b, raises to T, resulting in the finite form *is*.

The second departure from Moro's analysis is that information structure is given a decisive role in determining which element raises to subject position. Following suggestions in Partee (2000: 199), I propose that raising of the predicative element is only possible when it is the topic of the sentence. In all other contexts, the referential XP raises. This goes part of the way in accounting for the long-standing observation that the topic-focus structure of specificational clauses is fixed (subject is topic, post-copular element is focus) whereas the topic-focus structure of predicational clauses is not restricted (see Higgins 1979: 234-236, Partee 2000: 199-200, and references cited there). In the minimalist analysis developed in Mikkelsen (2005: 162-190), predicate raising is triggered by the presence of an uninterpretable topic feature on T, which must be checked by the DP that raises into subject position. Just in case the referential DP is not topic but the predicative DP is, the latter will move to subject position. The English lexicon also contains a T that lacks the uninterpretable topic feature, which is involved in deriving predicational clauses with non-topic subjects: since the referential DP is the one closest to

T, it will move to subject position, all other things being equal (see Mikkelsen 2005: 176-179).

I further assume that the nature of the EPP restricts the subject position to DPs, which is why (28) is not a possible specificational clause (compare (28) with the predicational (29)).

(28) *Tired is Beverly.
(29) Beverly is tired.

One of the central tenets of the predicate raising analysis is that the subject of a specificational clause is semantically predicative (type <e,t>), and that this sets specificational clauses apart from predicational and equative clauses, which both have referential (type e) subjects.[6] As will become clear below, the special semantic status of the subject is key to the hypothesized connection between specificational clauses and truncated clefts.

4. Truncated clefts as specificational clauses

We are now in a position to substantiate what it means to analyze truncated clefts as specificational clauses. For concreteness, let us consider the truncated cleft in (30).

(30) It is Beverly.

Applying the predicate raising analysis to (30) leads us to say that it is derived from an underlying PredP structure in which the pronoun is the sister of Pred and *Beverly* is in the Spec-PredP position:

(31)

```
                 TP
               /    \
                     T'
                   /   \
                  T     v_bP
                       /    \
                     v_b     PredP
                     be     /     \
                         DP_e      Pred'
                       Beverly    /    \
                                Pred    DP_<e,t>
                                         it
```

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[6] This is not the only possibility. Predicational clauses may have quantificational subjects: (*Everyone is tired)* and equative clauses can equate non-individuals (*Seeing is believing*; *Honest is honest*). What is unique to specificational clauses is that they have a predicative subject and an individual-denoting complement.   See section 4.3.

The predicative pronoun raises to subject position, while *Beverly* remains in situ, resulting in the surface order in (30). The pronoun must find an antecedent in either the linguistic or non-linguistic context, and since the pronoun is semantically predicative the antecedent must be a property of some sort. The rest of this section is devoted to examining to what extent the predicate raising analysis can account for the properties of truncated clefts outlined in section 2. I start with the restrictions on the subject.

4.1 Restrictions on the subject

Recall that truncated clefts allow only *it* and *that* as subject, and not *she*, *he*, *they, those* or any other pronoun. This restriction finds a natural account under a specificational analysis, once we consider another set of pronominalization facts discussed in Mikkelsen (2005: 64-93). As the examples below illustrate, there is a systematic contrast in pronominalization of the subject of specificational, predicational, and equative copular clauses. This contrast can be observed in tag questions (32) and in left-dislocation structures with resumption (33):

(32) a. The best baker is Beverly, isn't it?
    b. The best baker is from Germany, isn't she/he/*it?
    c. Beverly is Mrs. Robinson, isn't she/*it?

(33) a. The best baker, that/it is Beverly.
    b. The best baker, she/he/*it/*that is from Germany.
    c. Beverly, she/*it/*that is Mrs. Robinson.

The a. sentences are specificational and the subject is referred back to with the neuter pronoun *it* or with the demonstrative *that*.[7] In contrast, the subject of predicational (32b, 33b) and equative (32c, 33c) clauses is resumed with the appropriate non-neuter pronoun *she* or *he*. In Mikkelsen (2005) I argue that this reflects a difference in semantic type (though see Mueller-Reichau (2006: section 4.1) for a different view). The pronouns *she* and *he* are referential (type e) and as such can be anaphoric to another individual-denoting DP. In contrast, *it* and *that* can only be used referentially with reference to non-humans, and when they occur with an antecedent describing a human, as in (32a) and (33a), they are in fact property anaphors (extensionally, type <e,t>). The use of *it* and *that* as property anaphors is independently attested in the following, non-specificational examples (see section 5.1 for discussion of this point).

(34) They said that Sheila was beautiful and she is **that**.   [Ross 1969: 357]
(35) John is president of the club. **It** is a prestigious position.   [Doron 1988: 299]

In (34), *that* is anaphoric to *beautiful* (itself the predicate complement of a predicational clause), and in (35), it is anaphoric to *president of the club* (also the predicate complement of a predicational clause).

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[7]   The demonstrative *that* cannot occur in tag questions for prosodic reasons (Kuroda 1968: 250-251, Declerck 1988: 238). The assumption that the pronoun in a tag question is anaphoric to the subject of the tagged clause is defended in Mikkelsen (2005: 90-92).

At this point we can make a connection to truncated clefts via the question-answer pair in (36):

(36) Q: Who do you think the best baker is?
    A1: It/That's Beverly.
    A2: The best baker is Beverly.

The question in (36) is specificational in form and can be answered felicitously with a truncated cleft (A1). Note that *Beverly* corresponds to the *wh*-word of the question, and my proposal is that *it/that* corresponds to *the best baker* (we can tell that *the best baker* is in subject position of the embedded clause, because it precedes the copula; Higgins 1979: 226-227). The "regular" specificational clause in A2 is also a possible truth-conditionally equivalent answer, though the repetition of the definite description perhaps makes it somewhat pedantic. Under the proposal that I am making here, (36) is analogous to (37), where the two answers differ only in whether the subject is pronominal or not.

(37) Q: Who do you think Fred likes?
    A1: He likes Beverly.
    A2: Fred likes Beverly.

Now contrast (36) with (38):

(38) Q: Where do you think the best baker is?
    A1: He/She's in the kitchen.
    A2: #It/#That's in the kitchen.

The question in (38) is predicational in form and requires a predicational answer, such as A1. A2 of (38) shows that *it* and *that* cannot be used with reference to a human, replicating the pattern in tag questions and left-dislocation structures (see (32) and (33) above). This is important because it challenges an alternative analysis of truncated clefts, one where the subject pronoun is assumed to be referential along with the complement, in particular the equative analysis proposed in Ward et al. (2003) and Birner et al. (2005). I return to this in section 5.1.

    It's worth asking what the specificational analysis predicts about the meaning of truncated clefts, in particular the interpretation of the subject pronoun. As pronouns, the predicate anaphors *it* and *that* depend on context for their interpretation. Like other pronouns, their denotation can be fixed either by the linguistic context or by the non-linguistic context. The question-answer pair in (36) is an example of the former, the latter is exemplified by (1d) when it is used following a knock on the door (see Büring 1998 for a fuller range of examples). In either case, general strategies for pronoun resolution require that a) the antecedent be of the right kind (in this case a property), b) the antecedent be contextually salient, and c) the resulting interpretation be pragmatically felicitous. Thus, while *he* could in principle refer to someone other than Fred in (37), *Fred* is the only antecedent that is of the right kind, is contextually salient, and that makes A1 a felicitous answer to the question posed. Analogously, while *it/that* could in principle refer to any

property whatsoever, in (36) *the best baker* is the only antecedent that is of the right type, is contextually salient, and that makes the truncated cleft a felicitous answer to the question posed.

4.2 Restrictions on the verb

Let us next consider the fact that truncated clefts occur only with the copula and not with other raising verbs (like *seem*). First, note that there are severe restrictions on the PredPs that *seem* (and other raising verbs) can combine with in the first place (see Matushansky 2002):

(39) Beverly seems tired.
(40) ?Beverly seems a good baker.
(41) *Betty seems from Germany.

But let's assume for the sake of argument that *seem* can combine with PredP in principle and allow the referential argument of PredP to raise to subject position, as in (39) and (40). Then, the question becomes why the second predicative element cannot raise. If it could, sentences like (42) and (43) should be grammatical.

(42) *The best baker seems Beverly.
(43) *It seems Beverly.

I would like to suggest that this is because the T that bears the uninterpretable topic feature is severely restricted in its distribution. In particular, it selects for a v_bP complement, and hence cannot combine with a vP headed by any other verbal element. The intuition behind this suggestion is as follows: the topic feature on T has the effect of letting subject choice be governed by information structure. In Mikkelsen (2005) I suggest that this is possible in copular clauses because of the extreme semantic lightness of the copula. The ungrammaticality of (42) and (43) indicates that, even though raising verbs like *seem* are also fairly light semantically, they do not allow this (Matushansky 2002 for detailed discussion of the semantics of *seem*). Note that this restriction also accounts for why we don't find topic-driven movement to subject position in regular transitive clauses (i.e. why *He saw Sally* can't mean that a topical male individual was seen by Sally).

4.3 Restrictions on the post-copular element

Under the predicate raising analysis of specificational clauses, the post-copular DP in truncated clefts is the element merged in the specifier of PredP. The semantic type of Pred requires this element to be referential (type e), which goes a long way towards accounting for the restrictions on the post-copular DP in truncated clefts. In the positive direction, (most) DPs can certainly be referential, so we expect them to occur there. In the negative direction, other phrases (NP, AP, PP, VP, and CP) standardly denote something other than an individual (e.g. a set of individuals, a set of events, a truth value, or a function from world-time indices to these) and hence we understand why they do not occur in the post-verbal position of truncated clefts. However, it has been argued that at least some of these, including APs like *blue*, non-finite VPs, and CPs, can type-shift into expressions of type e

via a type-shifting operator nom (Chierchia 1984, Partee 1987, Potts 2002). This allows us to understand why the sentences in (44) have specificational readings:

(44) a. Her favorite color is blue.
      b. The next step is finding a suitable location.
      c. The problem is that they never reported the theft.

Moreover, there are truncated cleft versions of these, as long as we specify a suitable antecedent for the subject pronoun:

(45) Q: I wonder what her favorite color is.
     A1: It's blue.

(46) Q: I wonder what the next step should be.
     A: It should be finding a suitable location.

(47) Q: I wonder what the problem is.
     A1: It's that they never reported the theft.

Contrast (45) with (48), in which the embedded clause is predicational and, at any rate, asks for a property. The question forces *blue* to be semantically predicative ($<e,t>$) in the answer, which is fine in the predicational A2, but rules out the truncated cleft in A1 as a possible answer:[8]

(48) Q: I wonder what color her eyes are.
     A1: #It's blue.
     A2: They are blue.

As for disallowing a quantificational DP in the post-copular position, regular specificational clauses parallel truncated clefts:

(49) #It was no one/everyone.
(50) #The leader of the demonstration was no one/everyone.

We could appeal again to the semantic composition of PredP to account for this. Recall that the phrase that surfaces in the post-copular position in specificational clauses is merged as the second argument of Pred, i.e. as the sister of Pred' (see (26) and (27)). The semantic

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[8] Heggie (1993) argues that full clefts don't allow predicative elements in the post-copular position, because that would violate a restriction on the null operator in the cleft clause (essentially that this operator cannot be thematically unsaturated). She further argues (pp. 50-53) that apparent examples of full clefts with a predicative element in the post-copular position (*It's blue that her eyes are*) are metalinguistic in nature and require a different account. To the extent that no predicative reading is available for *blue* in the truncated cleft in A1 of (48), irrespective of context, that would indicate that truncated clefts do not allow metalinguistic readings. See also Hedberg (2000: fn. 31) for relevant discussion.

type of Pred' is <e,t> (the result of combining the Pred head of type <<e,t>,<e,t>> with its type <e,t> complement), which I have interpreted above as s-selection for a referential second argument. If so, we understand why (49) and (50) are out: the second argument of Pred is quantificational, but Pred requires a referential second argument. However, there are two reasons to question this account. The first is theoretical: if s-selection is understood in terms of the semantic type of heads, it would be appealing to reduce it to type-compatibility (in the spirit of type-driven interpretation): if a node can combine with its sister by one of the recognized principles of semantic composition (most prominently functional application) then s-selection is met. Interpreting s-selection in this way, we lose our account of (49) and (50): if the DP sister of Pred' is quantificational (type <<e,t>,t>) it can combine with a Pred' of type <e,t>, though the DP would be the functor taking Pred' as its argument, and not vice versa. One could respond by retreating from identifying s-selection with type-compatibility and maintain that Pred s-selects (in some richer sense) for a referential second argument. However, and this is the second objection, there is evidence that PredP can take a quantificational DP as its second argument. In particular, predicational copular clauses with quantificational subjects are possible (51), as are embedded PredPs with an initial quantificational DP in situ (52) (see also foonote 6).

(51) a. No one was the leader of the demonstration.
     b. Most people are in the kitchen.
     c. Everyone is a winner.

(52) I consider [most people honest].

If we want a unified analysis of predicational copular clauses, it seems that we must allow PredP to take a quantificational second argument (which can be done by not imposing any s-selectional restrictions beyond type-compatibility). Then, the challenge is how to prevent predicate-raising of the lower DP across this quantificational DP. I don't have much to say about this at present, except to note that quantificational DPs are also generally infelicitous in the focus position of full clefts (see Heggie 1993 for relevant discussion).

Finally, we turn to the observation that possessives carry their usual existence and uniqueness presuppositions when they occur in the post-verbal position of a truncated cleft, whereas these may be lost in the corresponding copular clause containing a non-neuter subject pronoun. On a somewhat speculative note, I'd like to suggest that we can understand this as follows: in their normal use, possessives carry existence and uniqueness presuppositions (Barker 1995: 4-5, 78ff). In terms of semantic types, the normal uses involve referential (type e) and quantificational (type <<e,t>,t>) possessives. However, when used predicatively (type <e,t>), the existence and uniqueness presuppositions are lost and the possessive simply denotes the set of entities that satisfy the descriptive content of the DP (see Partee 1987: 125 for a related suggestion about definite descriptions; the discussion in Graff 2001: 12-23 is also relevant here). Thus, *Adrian's sister* would denote the set of individuals who stand in the sister-relation to Adrian, without placing any restrictions on the cardinality of this set (see Barker 1995: 52). The predicative meaning is possible in copular clauses like *She is Adrian's sister* because *she* denotes an individual that can be predicated over. In contrast, in *It is Adrian's sister*, *it* denotes a (contextually

salient) property, forcing the possessive into its referential denotation, and hence we find the usual existence and uniqueness presuppositions.

4.4 Properties of the entire construction

If truncated clefts are indeed specificational clauses with a pronominal subject, we expect them to have a distribution similar to that of specificational clauses, but with the additional requirement that a suitable antecedent for the pronoun be available. This lets us understand the question-answer pair in (36) above. As noted in the introduction in connection with (1d), non-linguistic antecedents are also possible. This is as expected if *it* and *that* are simply pronouns here, since other pronouns, including the referential versions of *it* and *that,* allow either linguistic or non-linguistic antecedents; they are deep anaphors in the sense of Hankamer and Sag (1976).

The fact that truncated clefts almost never invert (cf. #*Beverly is it*), whereas regular specificational clauses generally can (*Beverly is the best piemaker*), presents a problem for the predicate raising analysis, since this analysis assumes (at least in the implementation developed in Mikkelsen 2005) that predicational clauses are unmarked and always possible. While I can't offer a definitive solution to this problem, I would like to mention some factors that seem relevant to a future solution. First, the claim that a predicational realization is always possible is based on the observation that it represents the default alignment of semantic type with syntactic position (specifically type e with subject position and type <e,t> with non-subject position). However, this ignores the pragmatic contribution of pronominalization (thanks to Gregory Ward for pointing this out to me). It is possible that when both DPs are non-pronominal a predicational realization is indeed always possible, but that when the predicative element is pronominalized it "tips the scale" in favor of the specificational realization, because pronominals are natural (continuation) topics (cf. Centering Theory). While this line of reasoning seems promising to me, an immediate problem is that *She is it*, where both DPs are pronominal, is no more felicitous than *Beverly is it.* A second possibility is that the inverted (i.e. predicational) versions of truncated clefts somehow "lose out" to ellipsis. That is, A2' in (53) is degraded because the elliptical realization in A3 is available (Baltin 1995 and Mikkelsen 2005: 99-101 argue that A3 is the result of VP ellipsis despite the apparent category mismatch). That proposal in turn raises the question of why the availability of VP ellipsis does not render A1' infelicitous. Here, it might be relevant that A1' does not depend on the presence of a salient property (the definite description does not require an antecedent), whereas A2' and A3 both do.

(53) Q: Who is the best pie-maker?
   A1:   The best pie-maker is Beverly.
   A1':   Beverly is the best pie-maker.
   A2:   It is Beverly.
   A2': #Beverly is it.
   A3:   Beverly is.

A third potentially relevant observation is that there do seem to be certain semantic domains (involving standard personal attributes like names, addresses, phone numbers, shoe sizes etc., as well as times and dates) where the specificational realization (the a. sentences) is unmarked compared to the predicational one (the b. sentences):

(54) a. Her name is Beverly Bouwsma.
     b. Beverly Bouwsma is her name.

(55) a. His phone number is 56789012.
     b. 56789012 is his phone number.

(56) a. The time is 5PM.
     b. 5PM is the time.

(57) a. The date is May 17th.
     b. May 17th is the date.

The b. sentences are grammatical, but seem to require a special (contrastive) context. One could speculate that the truncated cleft pattern in (53 A2-A2') is a special case of this.
        Finally we turn to the observation that there are contexts where a truncated cleft is felicitous, but its full cleft counterpart is not. In particular, questions that are formed on truncated clefts can be felicitously answered by a truncated cleft, but not by a full cleft:

(58) Q: Who is it?
     A1: It is me.
     A2: #It is me that it is.
     A3: #It is me that is it.

The fact that A1 is a possible answer is expected under the specificational analysis: the question is itself specificational in form and contains a predicative proform *it* (anaphoric to some contextually given property). The predicative *it* in the answer tracks the *it* in the question (either by being anaphoric to *it* in the question or by being codependent on the antecedent of the *it* in the question). What is puzzling is that a full cleft is not possible here, as shown by A2 and A3. I want to suggest that the infelicity of these full clefts comes from their cleft clauses being ill-formed. The cleft clause in A2 (*that it is*) is formed by relativization of the post-copular element of a truncated cleft: the subject pronoun is in its regular pre-verbal position, whereas the copula is followed by the gap of the A-bar extraction. Now note that relativization of the post-copular element of a specificational clause is generally impossible, whereas relativization of the referential element in predicational clauses is grammatical:

(59) a.*You should talk to Beverly, who the best pie-maker around here is.
     b. You should talk to Beverly, who is the best pie-maker around here.

(60) a.*I went to see my sister, who the only one who understands these matters is.

b. I went to see my sister, who is the only one why understand these matters.

I don't know what causes the ungrammaticality of (59a) and (60a) (see Moro 1997: 25-27, 45-50, Heycock & Kroch 1999: 370-371 and Rothstein 2001: 259-263 for discussion of related cases and also McCloskey 2002: 218 and references cited there for a possible account in terms of the relationship between relativization and information structure), but I want to suggest that whatever it is it is also the source of the badness of A2 in (58). The status of A3 is different, since the cleft clause by my criteria is not specificational (cf. the post-copular position of *it*). Instead, the cleft clause manifests a predicational order with a pronominal predicate, something that is generally prohibited (cf. (21) above). We can thus attribute the infelicity of both A2 and A3 to the infelicity of their cleft clauses, whose form is in turn governed by the question. This contrast between full and truncated clefts suggests a potential argument against treating the truncated clefts as derived from full clefts by deletion, as suggested by Declerck (1988: 241).

5. Alternative analyses of truncated clefts

We have seen above that the specificational analysis of truncated clefts is fairly successful in accounting for their properties, though several questions remain unanswered. In this section, I consider two alternative analyses proposed in the literature: Ward et al.'s proposal that truncated clefts are equative and Büring's expletive analysis.

5.1 Truncated clefts as equatives
Ward et al. (2003) and Birner et al. (2005) (henceforth BKW) propose that sentences like (61) are equative clauses with a demonstrative subject.[9]

(61) That's Beverly.

BKW argue that there are two possible interpretations for (61). In one, *that* is deictic and (61) equates the referent of *that* with the referent of *Beverly*. This deictic reading is available when (61) is used with no prior linguistic context, but a referent for *that* is available in the non-linguistic context. This use may be accompanied by a pointing gesture. When (61) is used as the answer to a question, say *Who is the best pie-maker?*, a second reading arises, which BKW identify as the truncated cleft reading. The question makes salient an open proposition (in the sense of Prince 1986), and *that* refers to the variable of the open proposition. In the present example, the question makes salient the open proposition THE BEST PIE-MAKER IS X, and *that* refers to the variable X. Given an equative semantics for the copula, this results in the interpretation that the best pie-maker is

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[9]   There are a number of earlier proposals to the effect that truncated clefts are equatives and that *it* or *that* is chosen over *she*, *he,* etc. when i) the number and gender of the subject referent is not clear, ii) the referent of the subject is unknown or unmentioned, or iii) the referent is "presented in dim outline." Declerck (1988: 210-215) provides a useful review of these analyses and shows convincingly that they all fail to account for the full range and use of truncated clefts.

identical to Beverly. Notice that at the sentence level this is indistinguishable from the meaning assigned by the specificational analysis, namely that Beverly has the property of being the best pie-maker. The two analyses differ in the meanings assigned to the pieces of the clause, in particular to the subject demonstrative, which is referential for BKW, but property-denoting under the specificational analysis. For an example like (61), the equative analysis entails that *that* is referentially linked to a human individual, either directly (the deictic reading) or indirectly via the variable of the open proposition (the truncated cleft reading). However, and this is my main criticism of the equative analysis, outside the context of truncated clefts *that* cannot be used in either of these ways. Consider first the deictic reading. (62) shows that *that* cannot be used felicitously with deictic reference to a human, and when the predicate selects for a human-denoting argument, as in (63), *that* gives rise to ungrammaticality.

(62) [Pointing to a person speeding by on the sidewalk] #That is moving very fast.
(63) [Pointing to a person leaving a voting booth] *That probably voted for Harper.

Similarly, if it were possible for *that* to be referentially related to a person via the variable of a salient open proposition (OP), we would expect the examples in (64) and (65) to be well-formed, contrary to fact.[10]

(64) Q: Who did you give the keys to?   [OP: YOU GAVE THE KEYS TO X]
       A:#I gave the keys to that/it.

(65) Q: I wonder who voted for Harper.   [OP: X VOTED FOR FRED]
       A:*That voted for Harper.

On the other hand, my claim that *that* denotes a salient property is not without problems either. As pointed out to me by Gregory Ward and Betty Birner, there are examples where it is not possible to get a property-anaphoric reading for *that*, despite the existence of a contextually salient property. For instance, it is not possible for *that* to refer to the property of being tall in (66) even when this is arguably contextually salient:

(66) [Context: An extremely tall guy enters the kitchen and takes down several objects from a very high shelf] A: #I wish I was that.

To achieve property-anaphoric reference here, *like that* must be used. I don't currently understand why.

There are two ways to interpret this set of observations: reference to humans by *that* and *it* is impossible, though they can denote properties, and when they occur as the subject

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[10] One could question this criticism on the grounds that in the answers in (64) and (65), unlike in truncated clefts, *that* is not equated with anything and hence the variable in the OP remains uninstantiated. If this were the source of the impossibility of these answers, one would expect *Someone voted for Harper* and *Whoever voted for Harper voted for Harper* to be equally infelicitous in (65), but these seem merely uninformative, whereas the answer in (65) is downright ungrammatical.

of truncated clefts they denote (contextually salient) properties. Other factors make property-anaphoric use of *that* impossible in (66). Alternatively, one could conclude (with MacClaren 1982: 99 and BKW) that it is generally impossible for *that* (and *it*) to denote humans, but that this ban is loosened exactly in the subject position of truncated clefts. The question that immediately arises is what singles out this position. In the absence of an answer to that question, the first position seems more attractive.[11]

Regarding the restrictions on truncated clefts reviewed in section 2 above, the equative analysis can account for most of these. The issue of restricting the subject position to *it* and *that* doesn't really arise in so far as truncated clefts are classed with equatives, which allow gendered pronouns. The semantic and pragmatic differences between the two kinds of equatives could be accounted for by saying that non-neuter pronouns cannot refer to the variable of an open proposition. The restriction to the copula follows from the semantics of equatives; *seem* cannot combine two referential elements (cf. *She seems Beverly; *Cicero seems Tully)*. The restrictions on the post-copular element likewise follow from the semantics of equatives: both arguments of the copula must be referential (or more generally, of the same type; see footnote 6). The fact that truncated clefts cannot be inverted is more difficult for the equative analysis, as other equative clauses can be inverted, including ones like (62) which involve one pronominal and one non-pronominal DP:

(61) a. Cicero is Tully.
  b. Tully is Cicero.

(62) a. SHE is Beverly.
  b. Beverly is HER.

Finally, Birner et al. (2005: 18) suggest that full clefts are infelicitous as answers to *Who is that*? (see (58)) because the cleft clause is redundant.

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[11] The example in (i) (from Cold Case 1/26/05 and related to me by Gregory Ward) indicates that there is at least one other environment where human-denoting *that* is possible, namely in the collocation *anyone but that*.

(i) Scotty: You are the goods, Nicky.
   Nick: But what you can't do ... is Ruth's sister. You know what I mean.
   Scotty: What do you think? What are you talkin' about?
   Nick: Scotty, serious. Anyone but that.

In this example, *that* seems to refer to a human, namely Ruth's sister. Note that *that* is not in subject position; if we undo the ellipsis we are left with (something like) *you can do anyone but that*, where *that* is part of the direct object. It might be relevant that the same speaker uses *what* in the pseudo-cleft in his earlier remark *(what you can't do ... is Ruth's sister),* since this is barred in some (more conservative?) dialects when the complement denotes a human. It doesn't seem sensible to claim a property-denotation for *that* in (i), nor that *that* refers to a non-human entity, so I would have to allow for human-denoting *that* in at least this context.

5.2 Büring's expletive analysis

Büring (1998: 44-46) argues that the subject of a truncated cleft is an expletive and that the post-copular DP is the logical subject (positioned in Spec-VP). The meaning of the "missing" cleft clause is attributed to a null proform which occupies the position occupied by the cleft clause in full clefts and is interpreted as a definite description. The null proform finds its antecedent in either the linguistic or non-linguistic context and the copula equates it with the overt post-copular element. This is similar to BKW's equative analysis, except that i) the second individual is contributed by a null proform and not by the subject pronoun, and ii) the anaphoric element finds its referent directly and not via an open proposition. Büring's analysis can account for most of the restrictions on truncated clefts: The restriction to the copula follows from the semantics of equatives, as does the requirement that the overt post-copular element be a referential DP (see Büring's paper for details). Büring's analysis provides a particularly clear account of why truncated clefts cannot be inverted: if *it* is an expletive, we do not expect to find it outside subject position (though see Postal and Pullum 1988). The restriction to neuter subjects is also straightforwardly explained, since non-neuter pronouns cannot be used as expletives. However, as (63) and (64) show, *that* also does not occur as an expletive (Hedberg 2000: 892), which means that the expletive analysis cannot straightforwardly be extended to truncated clefts introduced by *that,* as Büring acknowledges (p. 52).

(63) *That seems that they are late. (cf. It seems that they are late.)

(64) *That snowed yesterday. (cf. It snowed yesterday.)

Given the parallel behaviour of truncated clefts with *it* as subject and those with *that*, I take this to be a shortcoming of the expletive analysis. Moreover, other things being equal, an analysis that does not posit a null proform is preferable to one that does.

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I have grappled with the question of where truncated clefts belong in the general taxonomy of copular clauses. Building on earlier proposals, I examined the possibility that truncated clefts are specificational clauses with pronominal subjects, adopting the type-theoretical characterization of specificational clauses from Mikkelsen (2005). I found that the specificational analysis is fairly successful in accounting for the distinctive properties of truncated clefts, though some puzzles remain (including why the post-copular phrase cannot be a quantificational DP and why truncated clefts do not invert). I contrasted the specificational analysis with two other proposals from the literature: the equative analysis of BKW and the expletive analysis of Büring (1998). While each of these can also account for most of the properties of truncated clefts (in some cases better than the specificational analysis), they each face some problems that the specificational analysis avoids. One of the central assumptions of BKW's equative analysis

is that *that* can denote a human individual (either directly or via the variable of a truncated cleft), but I have given data that show that this is generally not possible, leaving this key assumption of the equative analysis unsupported. Moreover, BKW deal only with half of the puzzle, in so far as they do not analyze truncated clefts introduced by *it*. One of the drawbacks of the expletive analysis is that it relies on a null proform, and it is somewhat unclear what restricts the distribution of this proform. Moreover, the expletive analysis also only deals with half of the puzzle, in so far as it does not generalize to truncated clefts introduced by *that*. One could envision a hybrid analysis which analyzes *That is DP* as a demonstrative equative (following BKW) and *It is DP* as an expletive construction (following Büring 1998), thereby covering the full empirical range. How such a hybrid equative-expletive analysis would compare to the uniform specificational analysis suggested above, would depend, among other things, on how convinced one is by Hedberg's (2000) argument that the two differ only in the slightly different pragmatic requirements imposed by *it* and *that*.

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