same in arguments and predicates

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Anaphoric *same* can appear in argument (1) or predicative (2) NPs, with interpretive differences.

(1) I saw the rose on the table. Later I saw the *same flower* on the floor.

(2) The rose was red and beautiful. The *carnation* was *(the) same.*

In (1), *the same flower* expresses simple identity of individuals, while in (2), *the same* expresses a similarity of properties – like the rose, the carnation was red and beautiful. Sun (2018) posits an ambiguity (see also Alrenga (2007) and Matushansky and Ruys (2007)): argument *same* expresses simple identity \((\lambda y \lambda x . x = y)\), while predicative *same* expresses maximal similarity \((\lambda y \lambda x . \forall p \in P[p(x) \land p(y)])\) i.e. for some salient set of properties \(P\), for every element \(p\) in \(P\), \(p(x)\) and \(p(y)\). In (2) \(P = \{\text{red, beautiful}\}\). But the obligatory presence of *the* in (2) goes unexplained by the similarity view. We propose instead that *same* always expresses simple identity, and that NPs with *same* have standard NP denotations. Following Partee (1987) and Ross (1969), who note that anaphoric reference to properties is possible with *that*, we claim that *the same* in (2) refers to a property, but is otherwise an ordinary anaphoric definite. Its antecedent is *red and beautiful*, and the denotation of *the same N* is \(\text{NOM}[\text{red and beautiful}]\) – the anaphoric definite requires a nominalized property (NOM is Chierchia’s (1984) nominalization operator). Following Partee, the complement to *was* must be of type *e,t*, and this requires further application of Chierchia’s PRED operator, giving the interpretation \([\lambda x . \text{red}(x) \land \text{beautiful}(x)]\). So in (2), the rose and the carnation are similar, but not identical. This is not because of any ambiguity in the interpretation of *same*, but because the anaphoric definite in which it appears takes a nominalized property as its antecedent.

We have argued that *the same* (\(N\)) is always an ordinary NP with an ordinary NP denotation, and that *same* always means simple identity. But there is still a puzzle here. In some ways, predicative *same* is sharply distinguished from argument *same*: in English, predicative *same-NP’s* freely allow N-ellipsis, while argument *same-NP’s* do not.

The distinction between the argument vs. predicative *same* is not uncommon cross-linguistically. In particular, Mandarin Chinese uses a determiner-like element *tong* to express argument *same* while predicative *same* is expressed by an adjective *xiangtong* (3). The N *yangzi* ‘look’ is also allowed to drop in the latter case and crucially the NP *xiangtong-de hua* in (3) is not anaphoric to the referent previously introduced even if *xiangtong* seems to directly modify *hua* ‘flower’. Instead the identity of the relevant properties is involved so that the NP refers to a similar flower.

(3) Mali kanjian-le yi-duo meigui. wo kanjian-le {tong yi-duo hua/[xiangtong (yangzi)]-de hua}.
Mary see-PERF one-CL rose I see-PERF {tong one-CL flower/[xiang.tong (look)]-MOD flower}
Mary saw a rose. I saw {the same flower/the same-look flower}.

We tentatively conclude from such data that the two languages differ regarding the availability of (overt) lexical Ns that range over nominalized properties–in English, this option is highly restricted.
References


