Antipassive and indefinite objects in Nez Perce*

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This paper investigates the meanings of object nominals in two types of 2-participant clauses in Nez Perce (Niimiipuutimt): canonically marked TRANSITIVE clauses, where both subject and object agree and mark case (1a, 2a), and non-canonically marked CASE-LESS clauses, where only subjects agree and no case is marked (1b, 2b).¹

(1) a. 'ip-ním pée-qn’i-se qeqī-ne
   3SG-SUBJ 3/3-dig-INC edible.root-OBJ
   He digs qeqīit roots. (Crook 1999, 238)

   b. 'ipí hi-qn’īi-se qeqīit
   3SG 3SUBJ-dig-INC edible.root
   He digs qeqīit roots.

(2) a. iin-im ciq’amqaal-ním pée-p-teetu nukúu-ne
   1SG-GEN dog-SUBJ 3/3-eat-HAB meat-OBJ
   My dog eats meat

   b. iin-im ciq’amqaal hi-p-teetu nukt
   1SG-GEN dog 3SUBJ-eat-HAB meat
   My dog eats meat

A line of research stemming from Rude (1985) has argued that the meaning difference in the pairs above concerns the object nominal (Rude 1986, Carnie and Cash Cash 2005, ²)

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¹Labels for Nez Perce clause types have varied in the literature; most notably, in his dissertation and following papers Rude refers to canonically marked transitives as ‘ergative clauses’ and caseless transitives as ‘antipassive clauses’ (Rude 1985, 1986, 1992). While ultimately I agree with the antipassive analysis, I do not wish to presuppose it here, and so rely on the more neutral, morphology-based label for the moment. I do not wish to imply that all caseless clauses have the semantic properties investigated here, however; see Deal (2007a, 2007b) for details.

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Deal 2006). The (a)-examples above are ambiguous between a definite and an indefinite interpretation of the object (as Nez Perce lacks determiners and all overt encoding of definiteness). The objects of the (b)-examples, however, may only be interpreted indefinitely. I argue here that the objects of caseless clauses like the (b)-examples above are property-type indefinites. By contrast, the indefinite objects of canonical transitive (the (a)-examples above) are interpreted as quantificational indefinites. This basic contrast established, I turn to the question of whether the alternation in (1) and (2) should be analyzed as an antipassive alternation, as originally proposed by Rude (1985) (but contested by Woolford (1997), Carnie and Cash Cash (2005)). Based on evidence from intensional verbs and the scope patterns of indefinite objects, I argue that we have semantic cause to postulate an antipassive operator in the analysis of caseless clauses like (1b, 2b).

1. Semantics of non-canonical indefinite objects: property-type meanings

The contrast between the minimal pairs above has to do with object non-specificity: the objects of caseless clauses like (1b, 2b) must be non-specific. I follow many (e.g. van Geenhoven 1998, Chung and Ladusaw 2004) in assigning a property-type denotation to non-specific indefinites. Objects of caseless clauses have two semantic properties tracable to a property-type denotation:

1. Inability to be referential
2. Restriction to narrowest scope

We begin with the referentiality effect. Given a context where a particular discourse referent is established, the canonical indefinite object can be anaphoric to it, but the caseless indefinite object cannot:

(3) Context: There’s one red house in Lewiston, and yesterday, John found that house.

   a. Caan-ním páá-'yaƛ-na iní-ne
      John-SUBJ 3/3-find-PERF house-OBJ
      John found a house [particular house]
   b. Caan hi-'yáƛ-na iníít
      John 3SUBJ-find-PERF house
      John found a house
      Comment: "It’s not referring to the red house or anything, it’s just he just found a house that he’s been looking for"

This contrast in felicity judgments is reflected in the corpus-based results reported by Rude (1985, 1986), where it was found that the referent of a caseless object has, on average, been absent from the discourse for 13.84 clauses.²

²For the purposes of this count, Rude assigned a value of 20 to those referents that were truly new to the discourse.
Referentiality effects are also seen with proper names. A proper name used non-specifically cannot refer to its established referent:

(4) # Weet cúukwe-ce Angel?
    Y/N know-INC A
    Intended: Do you know Angel?

(5) # nuun wewluq-siix Harold poxpók’liit-ki
    1PL want-INC.PL H ballgame-INST
    Intended: We want Harold for the ballgame

Such sentences cannot be used to ask about Angel or to request Harold for one’s baseball team.

A non-specific object also cannot have wide scope, which we can see with respect to the distributive prefix wi. In a canonically marked transitive clause, this prefix distributes "over" the object:

(6) haháacwal-nim pee-wí-kewiyek-se picpíc-ne
    boys-SUBJ 3/3-DIST-feed-INC cat-OBJ
    The boys fed each cat

(7) ’e-nées-wíi-wetkuyk-six tuhuc mamay’ac-ne
    3OBJ-O.PL-DIST-take.away-INC.PL match children-OBJ
    We are taking matches away from each of the children. (Crook 1999, 135)

What is the relation between the distributive operator and the object in such examples? I assume the task of the distributive morpheme is to turn a property which could hold of a set of individuals collectively into one that must be distributed over members of the set. Given this assumption, despite our talk about an object being "distributed over", it seems that semantically, the object is escaping the scope of the distributive operator; the distributive operator produces a distributive property which is then predicated of the (canonical) object. In (6), for instance, the distributive morpheme turns the predicate kewiyek ‘feed’ into a predicate of distributed feeding. It is with this resultant predicate that the object composes. It seems then that the semantics of the object with respect to the distributive operator in the examples above are indicative of wide scope.³

Non-specific objects differ from canonical objects in that they cannot take wide scope with respect to the distributive operator. Rather, they remain below the operator, consequentially forming part of the distributive property that is predicated of another nominal.

(8) ’oykaloo hi-wíi-nep-tin’ix weptées-nim tu’xynu
    everyone 3SUBJ-DIST-hold-INC.PL eagle-GEN tail.feather
    They each are holding eagle tail feathers. (Aoki 1994, 1034)
    NOT: Everyone is holding each eagle tail feather

³It appears in fact that the canonical object must take wide scope with respect to the distributive operator; it cannot remain below it. See note 7 for a comparison of this case to the case of intensional verbs.
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(9) hi-pa-wii-’nahpay-ka tíimes kaa héecu
3SUBJ-S.PL-DIST-bring-ASP paper and wood
They each brought paper and wood. (Rude 1985, 160)
NOT: They brought each (piece of) paper and wood

The absence of readings with distribution "over" the non-specific object is then plausibly a result of the object’s inability to take wide scope with respect to the distributive operator.

The properties of non-referentiality and obligatory narrow scope that we have just seen for non-specific objects in Nez Perce also hold cross-linguistically. In Inuit (Inuktitut and West Greenlandic), non-specific objects are recognized differently:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canonical object</th>
<th>Non-specific object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nez Perce</td>
<td>obj agr, obj case</td>
<td>no obj agreement, no obj case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Greenlandic, Inuktitut</td>
<td>obj agr, no obj case</td>
<td>(a) no obj agr, oblique obj case, ANTIP morpheme (WG only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) obj incorporation, no obj case or agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, strikingly, the same semantic behaviors are attested. We see the same kind of referentiality effect in Inuit antipassive objects, for instance, as for Nez Perce caseless objects. The canonical object can be referential, as in (10a); the non-canonical object cannot, (10b). Accordingly, Douglas Wharram notes that (10b) cannot be used by two speakers who know him to discuss him.

(10) Antipassive in South Baffin Inuktitut (Wharram 2003, p. 31)
    a. Tuglasi  taku-lauq-t-a-ra
       Douglas see-PAST-PART-TRANS-1SERG.3SABS
       I saw Douglas
    b. Ippaksak Tuglasi-mik  taku-lauq-t-u-nga
       yesterday Douglas-MOD see-PAST-PART-INTRANS-1SABS
       Yesterday, I saw someone named Douglas ("a Douglas")

We see this same sort of effect with proper names in caseless clauses in Nez Perce. Both examples in (11) are grammatical, but just as in (10), the meanings are different. The canonical object (11b) is referential; the non-canonical object (11a) cannot be so. The question in (11a) can only be interpreted as referring to "a Rhode Island", "something called Rhode Island", just as in (10b).

(11) a. Weet timíipn’ise Rhode-Island
    Y/N remember RI
    Do you remember a Rhode Island?
    Comment: “Sounds more like you’re asking about the word ‘Rhode Island’”
    b. Weet ’e-tmíipn’ise Rhode-Island-ne
    Y/N 3OBJ-remember RI-OBJ
    Do you remember Rhode Island? [canonical]
    Comment: “That’s more like a direct question about Rhode Island”
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Back to Inuit, non-specific objects have obligatory narrow scope, just like in Nez Perce. This is seen for instance in their behavior with respect to the negative morpheme, as shown below.

(12) Inuktitut (Wharram 2003, p. 39)

Akittiq iqalung-mik taku-ngit-t-u-q
A fish-MOD see-NEG-PART-INTR-3SABS
Akittiq doesn’t/didn’t see (even) a single fish
NOT: There is a particular fish that Akittiq doesn’t/didn’t see

(13) West Greenlandic (Bittner 1987, ex 38b)

suli uqaasia-nik puiu-nngi-la-q
yet his.utterance-MOD forget-NEG-INDIC-3SGABS
He had not yet forgotten any utterance of his
NOT: There is an utterance of his that he had not yet forgotten

Here, as in the Nez Perce examples of non-specific objects with the distributive morpheme, the non-specific (and non-canonical) object cannot receive anything but narrowest scope.

We see then that non-specific nominals in Nez Perce and Inuit have in common their obligatory narrow scope and inability to be referential. Non-specific nominals get a special morphosyntactic treatment in both languages as well, a fact that we should not take for granted. (For instance, it seems that English specific and non-specific indefinites are largely indiscernable morphosyntactically.) The semantic hallmarks of non-specific objects follow if non-specific nominals have a special semantic type, a property-type: \(< e, t >\) or an intensionalized version thereof. Properties cannot take scope (they can’t QR) and cannot refer to entities (Wharram 2003, Chung and Ladusaw 2004, Farkas and de Swart 2003). We return in a moment to the question of the special morphosyntactic treatment of non-specific objects in Nez Perce. But first, their canonical cousins.

2. Semantics of canonical objects: quantificational indefinites

Recall that indefinite objects can be either caseless or canonical. If caseless objects have a property-type interpretation, what about indefinites with canonical object morphology?

We should first note that for canonical objects, narrow scope is generally possible, e.g. with respect to negation. The following examples have objects from the paradigm of negative polarity items/wh-words/indeterminates (cf. Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002), which are restricted to downwards entailing contexts: \(i\text{t}\text{ú}u\) ‘what/anything’ and \(i\text{s}i\) ‘who/anyone’.

(14) weet’u ‘i\text{t}\text{ú}u-ne ‘e-wéwluq-se

NEG INDEF-OBJ 3OBJ-want-INC
I don’t want anything
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(15) weet’u ’ituu-ne ’e-ki-ce ( ’etke hii-wes cik’éet’is )
  NEG INDEF-OBJ 3OBJ-see-INC ( because 3SUBJ-is dark )
  I don’t see anything (because it’s dark)

(16) ’e-nees-siw’e-ce ’isi-ne
  3OBJ-PL..OBJ-not.recognize-INC INDEF.HUM-OBJ
  I don’t recognize anyone.

In consequence of the restriction on this type of nominal, the objects in these clauses can only have narrow scope with respect to negation – even the negation found within a predicate like siw’e ‘not recognize’, as (16) shows. We recognize, then, that narrow scope is possible for canonical objects just as it is for non-specific objects, at least with respect to certain operators.

Wide scope is also an option for canonical objects, but is not mandatory:

(17) weet’u puteepit wenipi-ne ’e-cuukwe-ce
  NEG 100 song-OBJ 3OBJ-know-INC
  I don’t know 100 songs [ambiguous]

Example (17) shares its ambiguity with its English translation. As in many analyses of English, I propose to capture this variability by treating canonical objects as quantificational indefinites. Quantificational indefinite objects take wide scope with respect to a particular operator when they QR above that operator; they take narrow scope either by QR to a position below the operator or by interpretation in situ. The fact that narrow scope is possible with respect to negation inside a seemingly monomorphemic predicate like siw’e ‘not recognize’ perhaps favors the latter option.4

Interestingly, canonical indefinite objects in Nez Perce behave differently from those in Inuit, where only widest scope is possible, even out of islands. The following Inuktitut examples from Wharram (2003) demonstrate this widest-only scope behavior.

(18) Taqqialu-up tuktu taku-lau-nginx-t-a-(ng)a
  T-ERG caribou see-past-neg-part-trans-3sERG.3sABS
  a. There is a (certain) caribou Taqqialuk didn’t see.
  b. # Taqqialuk didn’t see a (single) caribou.

(19) Miali kapiasung-niaq-t-u-q arvi-up qajaq
  M. be.frightened-nfut-part-intrans-3sABS bowhead-ERG kayak
  kataja-kpagu
  hit-cond.trans.3sERG.3sABS
  a. There is a kayak x, and Miali will be frightened if a particular bowhead hits x.

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4 An in situ analysis of quantificational objects is feasible type-theoretically in light of the theory of verb meanings proposed by Kratzer (1996, 2003), where verbs combine only with theme arguments.
b. # Miali will be frightened if the bowhead hits any kayak.

These examples show that Inuit canonical indefinites are restricted to widest scope, a fact captured best by a choice-functional analysis (see Wharram 2003). Nez Perce and Inuit differ, then, in their lexical inventories of nominal operators; Nez Perce (and languages like English) has a quantificational indefinite operator which Inuit lacks. ⁵

3. **Intensional verbs are different**

We have seen that non-specific objects are restricted to narrowest scope while canonical objects exhibit scopal variability. With respect to an operator like negation, either a canonical or a caseless clause can get us a narrow scope reading:

(20) Context:  
'ee wenp-ú’ puteeptit wen’ípt  
you sing-IRR 100 song  
You will sing 100 songs.

(21) a. wéet’u kala-na 'e-cúukwe-ce wen’ípt  
NEG that.many-OBJ 3OBJ-know-INC song  
I don’t know that many songs! [canonical]

b. wéet’u cúukwe-ce puteeptit wen’ípt  
NEG know-INC 100 song  
I don’t know 100 songs! [caseless]

Intensional verbs are different from operators like negation: with respect to an intensional predicate, canonical objects cannot have "narrow scope" (i.e. an opaque/de dicto interpretation). Thus while non-canonical (22a) requires no commitment to the existence of purple cats, canonical (22b) entails that such cats in fact exist.

(22) a. 'ipéew’i-se cícicyele picpic  
seek-INC purple cat  
I’m looking for a purple cat [non-specific]

b. 'e-'péew’i-se cícicyele picpíc-ne  
3OBJ-seek-INC purple cat-OBJ  
I’m looking for a purple cat  
Comment: (surprised) "There’s a cat out there that is purple and you’re looking for it!"

This effect is also observed in Inuit, but as we have seen, Inuit canonical objects always take widest scope; it is especially noteworthy that the Nez Perce canonical object cannot

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⁵The status of choice-functional indefinites in Nez Perce has not been investigated at this point.
scope under the intensional predicate given that it may indeed take narrow scope with respect to other operators.  

What do we make of this contrast with intensional verbs? We know from Zimmermann (1992) that truly quantificational nominals cannot be interpreted opaquely:

(23) Alain is seeking each comic book.
     transparent; *opaque

(24) Alain is seeking most comic books.
     transparent; *opaque

Each and most are different from other quantifiers like all, some and even every, which can get a collective reading, and which can be interpreted opaquely:

(25) I have looked for every typo in the manuscript
     either transparent or opaque

Zimmermann proposes that opaque readings of intensional objects require the object to be of an intensional property type, the same type that has been proposed for non-specific objects more generally (see van Geenhoven and McNally 2005, Deal 2007b). Accordingly, those seeming quantifier phrases that receive opaque readings must be somehow treated by the semantics as being of a property type, not a quantificational type; it is in virtue of their property-type interpretation that they receive a "narrow scope" reading.  

Zimmermann proposes a type-shifting rule to accomplish this: those quantifiers which are in some sense "existential" can be type-shifted to an associated property-type denotation. This property can then form the opaque complement to an intensional verb.

Nez Perce canonical indefinites should cause us to reconsider the type-shifting approach. These quantificational indefinites are existential, but cannot be freely type-shifted to property-type denotations to get opaque interpretations. If we want an opaque reading, we have to use a form which is morphologically and syntactically different: the non-canonical, caseless object. It appears then that the difference between a quantificational

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6The same behavior is observed in Turkish (Kelepir 2001); canonical objects take wide or narrow scope with respect to negation and quantificational subjects, but only have transparent/de dicto readings with intensional verbs.

7While narrow scope is not possible for the canonical object with respect to the distributive operator either, the particular way in which scope can be narrow with respect to an intensional verb crucially differentiates the two cases. Narrow scope with respect to the distributive operator can be interpreted as the distributive operator merely occupying a higher syntactic position than the object, resulting in the \( \text{DIST} > \exists \) interpretation. But if opaquely interpreted objects (of intensional verbs) are of a property type, the difference between "wide scope" and "narrow scope" in an intensional context comes down to the choice between a quantificational object and a property-type object. The relative position of the two items in syntax or LF is not what makes the difference; the structure of the object is. For this reason the use of "scope" to describe transparent/opaque distinctions is probably an equivocation. Canonical objects must take wide scope with respect to intensional verbs for a semantic reason: they are quantificational and cannot be type-shifted to properties, as discussed in the text below. They must take wide scope with respect to the distributive operator presumably for a syntactic reason, such as a requirement that the object leaves VP and consequentially scopes over very low operators.
interpretation of an indefinite and a property-type interpretation is not the result of an isolated semantic typeshift. Effects on morphosyntax imply a syntactic difference between property-type indefinites and quantificational indefinites.

4. Does Nez Perce really have an antipassive alternation?

I return now to the question of how best to analyze non-specific object constructions in Nez Perce, clauses like (26):

(26) Caan hi-’yáâx-na infít
    John  3SUBJ-find-PERF house
    John found a house

The debate over such examples has focused on the question of whether they are best treated as antipassives. Rude (1985) marshalls discourse evidence to support an antipassive analysis; later authors (i.a. Woolford 1997) have largely rejected the antipassive analysis in light of the absence of any visible antipassivizing morphology. I argue here that there is good reason to posit a covert antipassive head in the analysis of clauses like (26): such a head is needed for the proper treatment of non-specific objects of intensional verbs.

To see this, we turn to the question of what antipassive morphology might be doing semantically in those languages where we can be sure of its existence, e.g. West Greenlandic. What should an antipassive morpheme have to do with a property-type object construction? I adopt from Wharram (2003) the idea that the role of an antipassive morpheme is to convert entity-taking verb roots (type $< e, st >$, where $s$ is the type of events and agents are not introduced by verb roots) into "semantically incorporating" forms of type $< et, st >$.

(27)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{V: } < e, st > \\
\text{NP: } < e, t > \\
< et, st > \\
< s, t >
\end{array}
\]

In formulating the specifics of this type-shifting operator, we must consider the role played by antipassive morphology in the semantics of intensional predicates. In Inuit, just as in Nez Perce, only non-specific nominals (which we can recognize morphologically) can receive opaque readings in intensional complements. In West Greenlandic, the antipassive head is visible in such cases. What role could the antipassive morpheme be playing here?


   J.-ERG book.ABS.SG look.for-IND-trans-3SG.3SG
   Juuna is looking for the book/a specific book.
b. Juuna atuakka-mik ujar-lir-p-u-q.
   J.ABS book-MOD look.for-ANTIP-indic-intrans-3sg
   Juuna is looking for any book.

We see in these examples that the morphologically simpler form of an intensional verb root can only give us the transparent reading (28a). To get opacity, we need extra morphology: the antipassive. This implies that opaque forms of intensional verbs are not basic (contra Zimmermann 1992). It seems rather that opaque forms of intensional verbs are derived semantically (as well as morphologically) from transparent verbal roots plus antipassivizing morphology.

If antipassive morphology is what takes a transparent verbal meaning into an opaque one, then we cannot adopt an antipassive morpheme which is simply a semantic incorporation shift (contra Wharram 2003, Deal 2006):

(29) Too simple an ANTIP:
\[ \lambda P_{<e,s,t>} \lambda Q_{<e,t>} \lambda e \exists x. P(x)(e) \land Q(x) \]

If we just used a simple shift like this – or an essentially equivalent method like putting verb and object together via Chung and Ladusaw (2004)’s Restrict and then doing existential closure – we would not be able to get opaque readings for objects of intensional verbs. We would not be able to existentially close the objects of intensional verbs inside the scope of the modality associated with the verb. Rather, the intensional predicate would introduce quantification over worlds inside the scope of the \( \exists \) quantifier introduced by ANTIP, giving us, schematically \( \exists x \ldots \forall w. P(x)(w) \) – that is, we would require the same object \( x \) to exist in all the worlds quantified over by the intensional verb. This is clearly not the opaque reading we want to derive.

Returning to the Nez Perce case, we confirm once again that non-specific nominals behave just as their Inuit counterparts do. Property-type (i.e. caseless) objects of intensional verbs in Nez Perce get opaque readings:

(30) kismis-pe sapatk’ayn wewlq-siix Meli kaa Cosef
    christmas-LOC show want-INC.PL Mary and Joseph
    For the Christmas show we want a Mary and a Joseph

Nez Perce does not show us the antipassive morphology that West Greenlandic displays in such cases. Nevertheless, the combination of intensional verb and property-type object produces the same semantic result: opacity. Just as in the West Greenlandic case above, there’s more for us to account for semantically in Nez Perce caseless clauses than just property-type nominals; we must also account for how the existential closure of the property is interpreted within the scope of the modality associated with a predicate like ‘want’, yielding the opaque interpretation. I propose, therefore, that Nez Perce caseless clauses like (30) contain an operator that not only allows the verb to compose with a property-type object, but also introduces modal quantification over that object. In West Greenlandic, these two
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semantic functions correlate with antipassive morphology. Given that we need an operator to perform these two semantic functions in Nez Perce non-specific object constructions as well, it seems plausible to postulate a covert antipassive morpheme in Nez Perce as well.

A full investigation of the semantics of the ANTIP morpheme is enough to occupy a much longer paper; the fine print can be found in Deal (2007b). I’ll confine myself here to the barest of summaries. The antipassive morpheme I propose is given below in (31), where e is the type of individuals, s is the type of events, w is the type of worlds, and t is the type of truth-values.

\[
\lambda P_{e,s,w,t} . \lambda Q_{e,s,w,t} . \lambda e \lambda w . \forall w' \text{ compatible with intent}(e) \text{ in } w \\
\exists x. Q(x)(w') \& P(x)(e)(w')
\]

The type-structure of this morpheme requires a property-type object, giving us the features of non-referentiality and obligatory narrow scope discussed in section 1 above. In addition, unlike non-modalized ANTIP (29), we bring in modal embedding of the property-type object and verbal meaning. The modalization scopes above the existential closure of the property-type argument, avoiding the problem with intensional verbs discussed above. We can now correctly analyze non-specific objects of intensional predicates as being existentially closed within the scope of the modality associated with the intensional predicate. This means that our ANTIP morpheme will not produce wrong results with intensional verbs, paving the way for a unified analysis of ANTIP in intensional and extensional vPs.

The modal accessibility relation here is drawn from an event. I assume that certain features of an event are recoverable from the event itself; e.g. the ‘content’ of a belief eventuality is recoverable from the associated event (Hacquard 2006). Similar machinery is here put to work in the case of event-associated intentions. The teleological accessibility relation in particular is motivated by contrasts like the following (Bittner 1987, ex. 80):

(32)  

a. illuigaq qimap-pa-a
    hunting.hut leave-TRANS.INDIC-3SGERG/3SGABS
    He left a hunting hut [canonical]
    must be a real hunting hut

b. illuikka-mik qimat-si-vu-q
    hunting.hut-MOD leave-ANTIP-INTRANS.INDIC-3SGABS
    He left a hunting hut [antipassive]
    need not be a real hunting hut, but something that was used as one

Even though the predicate here is extensional, we see a modal effect in the antipassive (32b): we are no longer necessarily committed to the existence of a real hunting hut. Bittner notes:

"There is evidence suggesting that, in [West Greenlandic], all antipassive predicates are world-creating, even if their transitive counterparts denote purely
extensional predicates. The sets of worlds that the antipassives create are subjective worlds of the agent – worlds in which things are as he perceives them or intends them to be.” (Bittner 1987, p. 225)

Such findings confirm the need for a modal component to ANTIP even outside of intensional verbs per se. See Deal (2007b) for a fuller discussion of the structure of intensional verbs and a derivation of the differences between intensional and extensional antipassive constructions.

5. Conclusions

I have argued for two classes of indefinite objects in Nez Perce: property-type indefinites and quantificational indefinites. Property-type indefinites show non-canonical case and agreement and are diagnosed semantically by their inability to be referential and their restriction to narrowest scope. Quantificational indefinites show canonical object morphology and are diagnosed semantically by their variable scope behavior with respect to negation but inability to receive opaque readings. I have argued on the basis of this last point that quantificational indefinites cannot be type-shifted to properties in Nez Perce.

Finally, I have argued that we need an antipassive head in Nez Perce to account for the semantics of property-type object constructions. If the meaning of antipassive morphology in a language like West Greenlandic were simply a rearrangement of semantic types, perhaps something like (29), we might not have cause to posit a covert antipassive morpheme in Nez Perce; we might instead posit that non-specific objects combine with verbs via Chung and Ladusaw (2004)’s Restrict or some similar analysis. But we have seen that the antipassive morphology cannot be given so simple a function in West Greenlandic, nor will Restrict suffice in intensional object positions. This is so because opaque readings of intensional verbs require the existential closure of the property-type object to be embedded within the scope of the modality associated with the predicate. This extra modality suggests a lexical source, a modalizing morpheme; I have proposed an ANTIP morpheme which fulfills just this function. We need an antipassive head in Nez Perce to account for the full semantics of non-specific object constructions, in particular how the existential closure associated with property-type objects of intensional verbs is modally embedded.

References

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