

## Truth-conditionality and grammatical status

Under a code versus inference division of labor between grammar and pragmatics, any interpretation conventionally associated with a linguistic expression is considered grammatical, even if it's not truth-conditional (Author, 2008, Fillmore et al., 1988, Prince, 1988). Conventional implicatures, such as the contrast associated with *but* and *although* are grammatical, then, despite the fact that they are said to not contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition. But are they then semantic, or are they part of a specialized “grammatical pragmatics” component? Prince has opted for the latter option, taking truth-conditionality as a significant parameter. Bach (1999), on the other hand, would lead us to adopt the former position. Challenging classical assumptions, he proposed that the contrast aspect of *but* is after all truth-conditional. (Under his proposal, some propositions, here contrast, are simply not prominent enough to affect subjects' conscious judgments, hence the impression that conventional implicatures are not truth-conditional). If so, the “grammatical pragmatic” interpretations associated with *but* are not different from semantic ones.

Based on questionnaire data I will propose that truth evaluations may not be a reliable criterion for distinguishing types of meaning. They are neither absolute nor dichotomous. Contra common assumptions, the Hebrew counterparts of (b-d) in () received different truth judgments (a preliminary questionnaire established that the contrast proposition involved is considered false).

1. a. **There is a contrast** between Ehud Olmert being Prime Minister and his being balding.
- b. Ehud Olmert is the Prime minister **although** he is balding.
- c. Ehud Olmert is the Prime Minister, **but** he is balding.
- d. Ehud Olmert is the Prime Minister **and** he is balding.

Only (a), where the contrast is prominently asserted, was judged false. Only (d) was judged true (as expected). Most importantly, (b) was judged close to false, and (c) was judged close to true.

The first conclusion we draw is that so-called pragmatic interpretations may have a role in truth evaluations. Second, if we take truth-conditionality as a criterion for distinguishing between types of meanings, we would need to distinguish between more than – versus + truth-conditional (to account for the difference between *but* and *although*). I therefore take issue with both Prince and Bach's assumption that truth-conditionality guarantees admission to the semantics club (Author, Forthcoming). Truth-conditionality is orthogonal not only to the grammar/pragmatics divide, but also to a potential distinction between “grammatical pragmatics” and semantics.

## References

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