

Cognitive linguistics, at least since Lakoff & Johnson's book on *The Metaphors we live by* (1980) and Turner's one on *The literary mind* (1996), has demonstrated that everyday language and its semantic and formal representations live on figures and operations (comparisons, analogies, mapping, blending...) which transport us to imaginary spaces or domains, to possible worlds –or worlds of fiction.

In this paper, and after my study on *Si* (Author 2005a), I would like to broach a compound marker: *Comme si / As if*, which has the property, like the conjunction *Si / If*, to introduce a “discursive frame” (the subordinate clause), whose truth value is not only *vericonditional* but *veridictional* too. In other words, the truth value of the conditional clause introduced by (*Comme*) *Si / (As) If* –and its conditional correlation with the main clause– has to be evaluated or calculated within the space opened by the introducer, given that this space is a mental representation of what the speaker supposes and wants that the interlocutor to suppose in his turn.

The main Coglingers dealt with conditionality (from Fauconnier 1984 to Turner 2000; from Sweetser 1990 to Lakoff 1996). Most of them consider that the best cases or examples of conditionality are the counterfactual ones: (1) *Si Clinton était le Titanic, l'iceberg coulerait* (Turner, 2000) = (2) *If Clinton were the Titanic, the iceberg would sink* (Turner & Fauconnier 2000). But in that case, as Turner (2000) says, the *If*-clause is not only counterfactual, it is also metaphoric: (3) *Clinton is not the Titanic, but he can be compared with it...* I just want to deal, in this paper, with the subordinate clauses that are at the same time **conditional and metaphoric**.

The first issue we will treat concerns the way we interpret, in cognitive terms, **a conditional clause as metaphorical too**. In other words, we interpret it as metaphorical on certain conditions: as the result of two operations, a blend of properties, and a blend of “counter-identities” (Goodman 1947). Thus, in (1), and in onto-logical terms, the comparison is obviously counterfactual because if Clinton may have some properties of the Titanic, he *is not* the Titanic, and so, cannot be *identified as* the Titanic in a “normal” (our factual, real) world (Author, 2005b). Conversely, in Goodman's example: (4) *If Julius Caesar were I, he would be alive in the twentieth century*, the identity is supposed to be complete between the entities (persons) belonging to different spaces, *Julius Caesar* and *I*. But, if this supposed complete identity is projected onto a possible world, there is no (obvious) comparison between the entities... Thus, the second issue we will deal with concerns the fact that it is necessary, for a cognitive reinterpretation of the *logics of possible worlds*, to distinguish analogy, or comparison, counterfactuality and conditionality (Author, 2005c). Finally, we will focus on the compound introducer *Comme si / As if*, given that it's a marker which integrates in its own structure two operations... of integration: the conditional one, and the metaphoric one.

References

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