A set of puzzles about names in belief reports*

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1 Introduction

In this paper I discuss a set of puzzles arising from belief reports containing proper names. In section 2 I present the linguistic data, the scenario in which the puzzles arise, and the puzzles themselves. In section 3 I outline how a naive descriptivist theory of names could deal with some, but not all of the puzzles. In section 4 I show that Kripke’s (1972) theory of names offers different solutions to some of the puzzles, but also fails to account for at least one of them. These sections are not intended as serious presentations or critiques of the two positions, but as a way of laying out the properties of the puzzles in more detail. In 5 I argue that the version of Kripke’s theory developed by Soames (2002) offers potential solutions to all of the puzzles, primarily in virtue of its differentiated conception of meaning and information. Section 6 sketches a linguistic analysis of the puzzles that is similar in spirit to the philosophical solutions offered under Soames’s theory, but differs in technical detail and formulation. Finally, section 7 discusses some open ends and variations on the puzzle.

2 The setup

Imagine the following situation:

(1) Tanya is the secretary of the department I am in. She was told at the last board meeting that a prospective student called “Rita” would be visiting the following week. I know Rita because we used to live next to each other. I have another friend, Susan, who is not applying to the program, but happens to come by the department to see me the week that Tanya is expecting the prospective student to show up. Susan doesn’t know which office is mine so she stops by the secretary’s office and asks her where my office is. Tanya forms the belief that that person who came to her office asking for me is the prospective student. Later that same day I run into Tanya and she asks me: Did Rita find you? I answer “no”, but later I realize that Tanya was confused about the identity of the person that came to see me. At the end of the day I relate these events

*Shortly after writing this paper I discovered that most of the material and ideas in it are anticipated in Berg (1988). Berg’s paper also demonstrates that these kinds of puzzles arise not just with names, but quite generally, and it offers much more serious proposals for how to understand and resolve the issues raised by these puzzles.
to my housemate Paula, who knows both Rita and Susan, and as part of my recounting I tell her (2).

(2) Tanya thinks that Susan is Rita.

Four interrelated puzzles arise from my utterance of (2) in the scenario given in (1).

**Puzzle 1: Why is (2) felicitous?** The first puzzle, which might not initially seem very puzzling, is why my utterance of (2) in the context of (1) seems to not only assert something true, but also to be a felicitous, appropriate, and justified way of asserting this true fact about Tanya, despite the fact that I am using words to describe Tanya’s belief that she herself is not in a position to use felicitously. In particular, Tanya would not use the name “Susan” to refer to the woman who came by the office.

**Puzzle 2: Failure of inference from belief attribution to belief assent** Though (2) seems both true and felicitous when uttered in the scenario described above, we cannot conclude that Tanya would assent to (3), which is just the embedded clause of (2) stripped of its matrix:

(3) Susan is Rita.

This is puzzling because we intuitively expect people to assent to their beliefs, and in many cases this type of inference seems to go through. So if I tell you (4)

(4) Abby thinks that the sun is hotter than hell.

it seems that you would be justified in assuming that Abby would assent to (5)

(5) The sun is hotter than hell.

**Puzzle 3: Failure to preserve felicity under substitution of coreferential terms** Nor can we conclude from the truth of (2) and my felicitous utterance of it in the scenario in (1) that Tanya is in a position to felicitously utter (6):

(6) I think that Susan is Rita.

This is puzzling because (6) uttered by Tanya and (2) uttered by me seem to express the same proposition: *I* in Tanya’s use of (6) refers to the same individual as *Tanya* does in my use of (2), namely Tanya, and the rest of the two sentences are identical. Moreover, the expressions that are exchanged (*I* and *Tanya*) do not occur in an opaque context; neither is in the scope of the intensional verb *believe* in (2) and (6).

**Puzzle 4: An apparent contradiction** In the same scenario where I can truthfully and felicitously utter (2) I could also truthfully and felicitously utter (7). (Small caps indicate that a word is prosodically prominent.)

(7) Tanya DOESN’T think that Susan is Rita.
This is puzzling because I seem to be attributing contradictory beliefs (or incompatible belief states) to Tanya — believing that Susan is Rita and not believing that Susan is Rita — but in fact I am not accusing her of logical deficiency, nor have I myself committed a logical sin. Rather, it seems that both are true, but that goes against the basic intuition, expressed in the Law of Non-Contradiction, that if a sentence is true its negation is false, and vice versa.

The reading of (7) that I have in mind — the one on which I think it is true in the context of (1) — is one where the negation targets not the propositional content of the embedded clause, but some metalinguistic component that is concerned with the expressions chosen to convey the belief, in particular the use of the names Susan and Rita. To bring out this reading I could continue (7) with one of the sentences in (8).

(8)  a. She doesn’t even know who Susan is.
    b. She doesn’t know that Susan is called ‘Susan’.
    c. She doesn’t even know that Susan exists.

To summarize: we need to explain how I can felicitously use (2) in the context of (1) (Puzzle 1), while allowing for discrepancies between my report about Tanya’s beliefs and what Tanya herself would assent to (Puzzle 2) and assert (Puzzle 3). Finally, we want to account for the appearance of a contradiction between (2) and (7) and why it is tolerated (Puzzle 4). As we see below, the first three puzzles are relatively easy to solve, while the fourth one presents a real problem for a (naive) descriptivist theory of names and for Kripke’s view.

3 A naive descriptivist analysis

We could assume that the referent of proper names is determined by Fregean modes of presentation (or their cognitively real counter parts like Crimmins and Perry’s (1989) notions), in particular that [the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting] is a mode of presentation for Rita and that [the woman who came by the office] is an mode of presentation for Susan. Under this naive descriptivist theory (NDT), (2) would have the Fregean content in (9).1

(9) Tanya thinks that the woman who came by the office is the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting.

If this is how (2) is interpreted we have an account of why I can utter (2) in the context of (1), since the embedded clause of (9) does seem to be a faithful rendering of Tanya’s belief. Thus the NDT offers a solution of the first puzzle.

With the second puzzle the NDT initially seems to run into a problem. If the two names are associated with the modes of presentations suggested above, Susan is Rita would be interpreted as (10).

(10) The woman who came by the office is the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting.

1I call this a naive descriptivist theory to emphasize that I am ignoring many complications and nuances dealt with in sophisticated descriptivist theories. Also, I am not attributing this theory to anyone.
In the given situation Tanya would assent to (10), but not (3), which seems problematic if (3) means (10). However, there is a plausible way out: under a descriptivist theory (including the naive one I am examining here) the mode of presentation associated with the name determines the referent of the name. To understand a name, in particular, to understand what a name refers to, one must know the (a) mode of presentation associated with the name. In our scenario Tanya can be said to know the meaning of the name Rita because she knows the referent-determining mode of presentation [the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting], but by the same reasoning we must say that Tanya does not know the meaning of the name Susan since she does not have an appropriate mode of presentation for that name. Tanya does have a mode of presentation for the woman Susan, namely [the woman who came by the office]. She just doesn’t attach it to her name (“Susan”). In fact, Tanya attaches it to the wrong name (“Rita”) which is why she doesn’t assent to (3), despite its semantic equivalence with (10).\footnote{Later I consider whether the scenario in (1) could be altered so that Tanya does understand the name Susan, while retaining puzzle 2. If so, the NDT solution just sketched wouldn’t be adequate.} By appealing to the fact that associating an appropriate mode of presentation with a name is necessary for understanding the name (and by implication the sentence it occurs in), the NDT manages to explain both why I can utter (2) — I associate the name “Susan” with the appropriate mode of presentation — and why Tanya wouldn’t assent to (3) — she she doesn’t associate any mode of presentation with that name.

Turning to Puzzle 3, we find a similar situation. Under the NDT, I think that Susan is Rita would be interpreted as (11):

\[(11) \quad \text{I think that the woman who came by the office is the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting.}\]

Tanya is in a position to truthfully and sincerely utter (11), but not the original statement containing the names in (6). So on the face of it, the NDT does not explain the third puzzle. Again there is a relatively easy way out: Tanya is not in a position to truthfully utter (6), not because she disagrees with its content, but because she does not associate the mode of presentation [the woman who came to the office] with the name “Susan”. (If she did, she would probably never have assumed that the woman was Rita in the first place!). So far the NDT is not doing too badly.

However, the NDT does not help us with the apparent contradiction (Puzzle 4). If I associate the names Rita and Susan with the appropriate modes of presentation, (7) would be truth-functionally equivalent to (12).\footnote{Can we appeal to a de dicto–de re ambiguity? It seems that this distinction does not cut any ice here, since the descriptions corresponding to the assumed modes of presentation do pick out the individuals Susan and Rita.}

\[(12) \quad \text{Tanya doesn’t think that the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting is the woman who came by the office.}\]

Now (12) is clearly false in the context given in (2), in contrast with the intuition that (7) — on the reading brought out by the continuation in (8) — is true. Thus (9) and (12) do express a contradiction when uttered by me in the context of (2). Moreover, we cannot appeal to a lack of knowledge, since I do associate the appropriate modes of presentations with the two names (as I suggest in section 6 it might argued that it is this knowledge that allows me to utter (2) in the first place).
So while the NDT offers at least partial solutions to the first three puzzles, it fails to explain Puzzle 4, in particular why the apparent contradiction between (2) and (7) is tolerated. Moreover, I had to appeal to very specific, context-dependent modes of presentations of the individuals to get the positive results.4

4 A direct reference analysis

Alternatively, we could assume that proper names refer directly to individuals, without appeal to a reference-determining mode of presentation. This is the view put forth by Kripke (1972), and defended by Soames (2002:55–95).5 On the direct reference view the puzzles take on a slightly different form.

The first puzzle (why I can felicitously and truthfully utter (2) in the context given in (1)) is resolved immediately. Under the direct reference view the three names used in (2) refer to the three individuals Tanya, Rita, and Susan. The sentence is true6, since Tanya does hold a belief, albeit a false one, about the other two individuals, namely that they are identical. The justification for the claim that Tanya holds this belief is that Rita is the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting and Susan is the woman who came by the office, but these descriptions do not play any role in determining the reference of the names as used in (2), nor do the properties they express figure in the proposition expressed by (2). My utterance of (2), which uses the two names, is therefore nonpuzzling: I am simply expressing that Tanya holds a certain belief about these two individuals, and since she does hold it, there is nothing amiss about my utterance.

What seems initially more puzzling under Kripke’s view is that Tanya in the context given would not assent to (3), though (3) expresses a proposition that she holds as a belief (Puzzle 2). A direct reference theorist could perhaps say that the reason Tanya would not assent to (3) is that she is not in a position to interpret (3); she is not causally connected with the referent for the name Susan, since she has not had the appropriate sort of linguistic exposure: no one has introduced her to Susan or used the name in conversation with the intention to refer to Susan. However, the assumption that Tanya has no acquaintance with the name Susan could be dropped without eliminating the puzzle. Imagine that I had mentioned Susan in a an earlier conversation with Tanya, e.g. to tell Tanya about Susan’s pet rat (see fn. 2). Then Tanya would have a causal connection of the appropriate sort with the referent of the name Susan, and therefore be able to utter Susan to refer to Susan, e.g. when uttering (3). Why wouldn’t she do it? Intuitively, because she fails to connect the name Susan with the woman that came into the office, but that is a lack of (world) knowledge, not a linguistic deficiency.

Similarly, the reason Tanya is not in a position to utter (6) — though it would be true if she did utter it — is that she would not know that (6) expresses the same commitment, at least as far as truth conditions are concerned, as (11), which she is in a position to utter.

With Puzzle 4, the direct reference theory seems to be at a loss: if the contribution of a

4But according to Crimmins and Perry (1989) this is expected, since notions are concrete cognitive objects, that arise partly through our interaction with the world.

5This view of proper names traces back at least to John Stuart Mill.

6Or rather, my utterance of it expresses a proposition that is true of the state of affairs described in (1). This qualification is intended wherever the wording has slipped in the text.
name to the proposition expressed is just the individual designated by the name, then (2) and (7) express propositions that cannot both be true at the same time: it is impossible for Tanya to both hold and not hold the belief that these two individuals are the same, in the same way as it is impossible for me to both be Danish and not be Danish.

5 Beyond rigid designation

Soames (2002) defends and extends Kripke’s analysis of proper names. Soames maintains that a name refers directly and rigidly to its referent, while allowing descriptive information about the referent to be conveyed by utterances of sentences containing the name. The idea is roughly this: when uttering a sentence $s$ of the form ‘Name is so-and-so’ one of the propositions expressed is the Russellian singular proposition containing the individual referred to by the name and the property expressed by ‘so-and-so’ (this is essentially Kripke’s view). For Soames this is the proposition semantically expressed by $s$ (pp. 65ff). However, the agent uttering $s$ may convey or even assert additional propositions, some of which contain descriptive information about the referent of the name. In some cases such an additional propositions may in fact be the primary assertion intended by the speaker, but it is nonetheless not the semantic content of the sentences as uttered by the agent in a context. This ability to convey propositions other than the one that is semantically expressed is also present in utterances of complex sentences, including belief reports like (2). Soames’ theory thus incorporates elements of descriptivist theories and direct reference theories, but allocate the two distinct and different roles in the construction of meaning. This is what allows Soames’ theory to deal with the fourth puzzle, where both of the theories considered above failed.

Starting with the first puzzle: why is it possible for me to truthfully and felicitously utter (2) in the context of (1)? It is possible because the semantic content of (2) is that a certain individual, Tanya, stands in the belief relation to a Russellian singular proposition, namely the proposition made up of two individuals, Rita and Susan, and the identity relation. And that complex proposition correctly expresses the state of affairs in (1). This is just the Kripkean solution.

As for the second puzzle, Soames discusses a principle which he calls Strong Disquotation which governs the kind of inference appealed to in the second puzzle:

\[(13) \quad \text{Strong Disquotation (Soames 2002:9)}\]
\[
A \text{ sincere, reflective, rational individual } i \text{ who understands } S \text{ is disposed to accept } S \text{ iff } i \text{ believes the proposition expressed by } A, \text{ and thereby satisfies } x \text{ believes that } S.
\]

This offers a potential solution of the second puzzle, since we can argue that Tanya does not satisfy the condition expressed by who understands $S$. If Tanya has never heard of Susan, perhaps she cannot be said to understand any sentences involving that name, including the embedded sentence of (2) (= (3)). However, in the discussion of the Kripkean solution to this puzzle (section 4) I showed that we can change the scenario in (1) so that Tanya has heard of Susan and therefore would be in a position to understand (3). My intuition is that even in this changed scenario Puzzle 2 would still arise: Tanya would fail to assent to (3), though I can truthfully utter (2).

The third puzzle is why Tanya could not assert I believe that Rita is Susan. Notice that on Soames’s analysis, as on Kripke’s, the proposition semantically expressed by this utterance
would be true in the given context. However, Tanya is not in a position to utter it, because she is not familiar with the name Susan. This linguistic deficiency seems to be captured by the competence condition for names proposed by Soames:

\[(14) \quad \text{Competence Condition for Proper Names (Soames 2002:65)}\]

In order to be a competent user of a name \( n \) of an object \( o \), two things are required. (i) One must have acquired a referential intention that determines \( o \) as the referent of \( n \). Two ways in this may be done are by picking up \( n \) from others who used it as a name of \( o \) and intending [to] use \( n \) to refer to the same thing they did, or by being independently acquainted with \( o \) and introducing \( n \) as a name for \( o \). (ii) One must realize that to assertively utter \( x \text{ is } F \) is to say of the referent, \( o \), of \( n \) that it “is \( F \).”

The question is whether Tanya is a competent user of the name Susan, in particular whether she “has acquired a referential intention that determines \( o \) as the referent of \( n \)”. In the original scenario in (1), the answer is no: Tanya has never heard of Susan, and, by assumption, no one has ever used the name Susan with the intention of referring to Susan in conversation with Tanya. Nor is Tanya independently acquainted with Susan in a way that would have allowed her to introduce Susan as a name for Susan. So Tanya fails part (i) of the competence condition for Susan. This would explain why she cannot felicitously utter (6), which contains the name Susan.

Consider next the revised scenario in which Tanya has heard of Susan; in fact, I have used the name Susan in conversation with Tanya to refer to Susan (and assert that she has a pet rat). If so, it seems that Tanya passes the first part of the competence condition: she can use Susan to refer to Susan by “picking up” the name from my use and intending to refer to whoever I referred to (that is, Susan). So it seems that Soames’ analysis is in the same trouble as Kripke’s with respect to puzzle 3 in the revised scenario. However, there is a second clause to the competence condition and both have to be satisfied. However, I think that it is not going to help with this problem. As I understand it, the second clause is essentially about linguistic competence, specifically the ability to understand predication: what we say when we say something about the object designated by the name. Since we have no reason to assume that Tanya does not understand linguistic predication in general, or the identity relation in particular, we have no evidence that she does not pass the second condition. If so, she passes the entire competence condition for Susan in Rita is Susan, and the infelicity of her uttering (6) remains unexplained.

Turning to the last puzzle, we see that Soames’ theory, in particular its more inclusive notion of linguistic meaning, does have something to offer. What I would say about Puzzle 4 based on Soames (2002) is this: (7) negates not the proposition semantically expressed by my utterance of (2), but some other prominent propositions conveyed (possibly asserted) by it, e.g. that Tanya believes (the proposition that) the individual called ‘Rita’ is the individual called ‘Susan’, where the names themselves figure crucially in the proposition that is conveyed (as abstract labels or pieces of linguistic material).\(^7\) Tanya does not believe the proposition containing the names (even if she had heard of Susan she does not think that the person called Susan is the person

\(^7\)This seems related to the discussion of metalinguistic information in Soames (2002:332, fn. 9). In that footnote, Soames says that metalinguistic information of the sort appealed to here “isn’t part of the semantic content”, though he acknowledges that such information is commonly conveyed by assertive utterances of sentences containing names. What I am suggesting here is that in a case like (6) the metalinguistic information is part of the primary assertion and the target of the negation.
called Rita.), but she does believe the Russellian singular proposition containing just the two individuals and the identity relation.

If this a viable interpretation of Soames’ position his theory does offer a solution of the fourth puzzle: why I can utter both (2) and its negation in (6). There is a second question though: are they both true? The discussion in Soames (2002:210–240) suggests the following answer: (2) is undoubtably true, since the proposition semantically expressed (that Tanya stands in the belief relation to the singular Russellian propositions containing Rita, Susan, and the identity relation) is true. The proposition semantically expressed by (6) is false, but since this is not the most prominent proposition asserted by (6) and the proposition that is most prominently asserted (the one containing the names themselves) is true, there is also a sense in which I do say something true when uttering (6). While this might seem messy to a logician or philosopher, I find that it does have linguistic intuition and a good deal of common sense on its side.

6 A sketch of a linguistic analysis

Intuitively, it seems as if I am allowed to use the names Rita and Susan in the embedded clause in (2) as I would use them, even though I am attributing the propositional content of the embedded clause to Tanya. The propositional content of Rita is Susan a (false) identity statement (‘rita = susan’). That identity statement can be expressed in a number of ways. The way Tanya would express it is as in (15) (= 10)

(15) The prospective student mentioned at the board meeting is the woman who came by the office.

The fact that I know that the prospective student is Rita and that the woman who came into Tanya’s office is Susan is what allows me to make the statement in (2).

Let me try to formalize these observations in a model-theoretic semantics. For simplicity I assume that Tanya has access to no names at all. She has heard correctly that there is a unique referent for the prospective student mentioned at the board meeting. Exactly one woman stops by her office, so exactly one student meets the description the woman who came by the office. She believes that these two descriptions pick out the same individual. So all her belief worlds w are such that

(16) \([\text{the prospective student}]^w = $, and \]
\([\text{the student who came by the office}]^w = $\)

We know that this is false, because we know (17), where @ is the actual world.

(17) \([\text{the prospective student}]^@ = [\text{Rita}]^@ = $, and \]
\([\text{the student who came by the office}]^@ = [\text{Susan}]^@ = $\)

It seems to me that when we truthfully report (2) in this situation, we appeal to the independent facts that we have established about the model. So in an indirect way, the names do the work of definite descriptions in this case: we exploit the equivalences in (16)–(17) in making the report.

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8Here I am following closely suggestions by Chris Potts.
I can use (2) in this way in my conversation with Paula only in virtue of these facts being part of our common ground (in the sense of Stalnaker (1978)).

Because of these equivalences, we can in this situation give (2) the following translation.\(^9\)\(^10\)

(18) \(\text{believe}_\Omega(tanya, \lambda w[\text{rita}_w] = \text{susan}_\Omega) = 1\) iff all of tanya’s belief worlds \(w\) in the actual world \(\Omega\) are such that \(\text{rita}_w\) equals \(\text{susan}_\Omega\)  
\(= 1\) iff \(\{w : w\text{ is a belief world for tanya}\}\) is a subset of \(\{w' : $ = $ \text{ in } w'\}\)

The translation in (18) works only because of accidental facts about the model, but it seems that we can also exploit non-accidental facts about the model when reporting on people’s attitudes. I could use something like (19) to convey that Fred thinks that I use size 4 shoes, even if Fred does not know that 2 is the unique even prime number and does not know what the proper meaning of ‘successor’ is.\(^11\)

(19) Fred thinks that my shoe size is the successor of the successor of the even prime.

The only difference between (19) and (2) is that in (19) we appeal to presumably nonaccidental facts about the model, whereas the felicity of (2) depends on some preestablished contingencies.

This is essentially the linguistic solution I have to offer for the first puzzle. As for the second one, the key observation is that Tanya is not in a position to assent to (3) because in her belief worlds \(w\) the two names are not necessarily coreferential. This is also why she is not in a position to truthfully utter (6): there are worlds compatible with Tanya’s beliefs in which Susan is someone other than Rita. As for the fourth puzzle, I suggest that the negation in the (7) must be an instance of metalinguistic negation, in the sense of Horn (1989) and Geurts (1998), for the utterance to convey a true proposition. In the words of Horn (1989:363) metalinguistic negation is “a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization’. In (7) it is targeting the choice of words used to express Tanya’s belief. There are three observations that support the claim that (7) involves metalinguistic negation. First, metalinguistic negation is typically accompanied by a special intonation or prosody (Geurts 1998:275). This fits with the fact that doesn’t must be stressed in (7) to bring out the intended reading. Second, metalinguistic negation typically requires a contrastive context of utterance, so that the sentence containing the metalinguistic negation can be interpreted as a denial of a previous utterance. I think this is also true of (7), which is more natural as a rejoinder from Paula to my utterance of (2). Finally, Horn shows that metalinguistic negation cannot be conveyed by a prefix like un- in unhappy. Thus if the intended reading of (7) involves metalinguistic negation, we predict that (20) where I have replaced doesn’t believe with disbelieves should lack this reading.

\(^9\)To make things simpler I am cheating a bit with the notation, subscripting the world index to the individual expressions and leaving out the semantic brackets. I believe the intended translation can be given in a more standard notation.

\(^10\)I am assuming that names, while semantically rigid are not epistemically rigid, meaning that in the set of worlds epistemically accessible to an individual the referent of a name n might differ across the worlds in the set. This will be the case when the individual lacks certain kinds of knowledge (see Aloni (2001:10) and Hintikka (1975)). So in our scenario Susan is epistemically non-rigid for Tanya. It is not clear to me how this line of analysis relates to the competence condition for proper names proposed by Soames.

\(^11\)I will not address the question of when my utterance of (19) is pragmatically licensed, but see Kronfeld (1990:85–115) for relevant discussion.
(20) Tanya disbelieves that Rita is Susan.

It seems to my (non-native) ear that (20) does lack this reading, and I cannot interpret it as making a true claim about the state of affairs in (2). (This holds even if I stress the prefix and pronounce the matrix verb as DISbelieves.)

7 Discussion

Above I have sketched several possible responses to the puzzles arising from my belief report in (2). Two of these (the one based on Soames (2002) and the model-theoretic one in section 6) offered at least partial solutions to all four puzzles, but the two accounts differ several respects. On Soames’ account the solution comes from recognizing that utterances, in addition to the proposition semantically expressed by the sentence, may convey other propositions. In the linguistic solution, this additional information is located, not in the utterance itself, but in the model assumed, specifically the common ground between the speaker and addressee.

7.1 Variations on the puzzle

As noted at various stages above, we can change the scenario slightly to tests whether the solutions offered for the original puzzles have general validity. I have not investigated these variations in any detail, but it seems like a worthwhile task.

Throughout I used exampled involving identity clauses (Rita is Susan). It now seems to me that this is not necessary to generate the puzzles. Perhaps they would even arise with expressions other than names? Again I don’t have much to say about these matters at present.

7.2 Relation to other puzzles

The set of puzzles discussed here seem in some sense to be the inverse of Kripke’s (1979) Pierre puzzle (and Crimmins and Perry’s (1989) Edward Tudor puzzle, and Mark Richard’s phonebooth case). In all of those, the puzzle revolves around an agent failing to realize that an individual or entity presented to her on two different occasions is in fact one and the same individual (though, it seems to me that one could quibble with this last point in Kripke’s London/Londres example). In the puzzles discussed here the agent fails to realize that two individuals presented to her on two separate occasions are in fact two different individuals. It might be worth seeing whether the solutions to puzzle 4 discussion above have anything to offer with respect to the other puzzles.

References


