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ASHGATE

2 'The suburbs of your good pleasure': Cognition, Culture and the Bases of Metaphoric Structure

Eve Sweetser

Within the bond of marriage, tell me, Brutus,
Is it excepted I should know no secrets
That appertain to you? Am I your self
But, as it were, in sort or limitation,
To keep with you at meals, comfort your bed,
And talk to you sometimes? Dwell I but in the suburbs
Of your good pleasure? If it be no more,
Portia is Brutus' harlot, not his wife.

Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, 2.1.280-87

INTRODUCTION: METAPHOR AND CULTURE

As a cognitive linguist, I am preoccupied with the relationship between language, culture and cognition, and with the balance between general human cognitive constraints and culture-specific cognitive patterns. One excellent place to look for this relationship, it seems to me, is in our relationship to texts from earlier periods in our own cultural history. Unlike many other Elizabethan authors, Shakespeare's appeal seems uniquely broad and lasting. What makes this so? How do phrases like *the suburbs of your good pleasure* still seem to reach out and grab us?

One component of an answer may be that he evokes extremely basic shared aspects of our cognitive structure – and yet constantly shows us how deeply ambiguous are the ways they play out in the broader contexts of our culture-specific worlds. His work thus 'catches' a modern audience partly because it is built on artistic use of image structures and metaphors which they share with the original audience – some of this shared structure being due to historical cultural continuity, and some to shared human embodiment and neural structure. Once caught, the audience is fascinated precisely because

Shakespeare does not settle down to one easy answer – the ambiguities in his understanding of humanity and social structure are what allow modern directors, audiences and critics such freedom to find productive readings without being Elizabethans.¹

This essay first displays some of the pervasive everyday-language correlation between two metaphoric structures, a vertical hierarchic model of Self and Society and a 'container' model of Self and Society. Experiential motivations for such a correlation are laid out, many of them based in cross-culturally human bodily experience. I then examine a scene from Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, as a salient instance of the way these correlated metaphorical mappings work together to create coherence in a literary text.² Our everyday familiarity with some of the basic underlying metaphors which structure Shakespeare's text gives us potential access to the more complex and fuller system of the text as a whole. And the fact that Shakespeare does not 'settle' on one single coherent model of Self or of Society, but questions and problematizes, means that readers do not have to adopt a particular Elizabethan cultural model in order to connect with the text.

Everyday cognitive models are not just 'such stuff as dreams are made on'; they are the stuff (or fabric) of our culture, our art, our literature. The cross-culturally shared nature of some aspects of our cultural models should not lead us to expect specific limits on the variety of their combinations, interactions and meanings, within one culture or across cultures. Literary genius may transcend at least some cultural boundaries precisely because it transcends some of the culture-specific cognitive structures which it also instantiates.

CO-ORIENTATION OF TWO BASIC METAPHOR SYSTEMS IN ENGLISH

Why is *down and out* a reasonable way to say 'destitute and unfortunate'? Why not *down and in* or *up and out*?³ The *down of down and out* characterizes a person as being metaphorically either (1) 'low' in a social or financial hierarchy or (2) no longer normally stable and self-supporting, too 'weak' to 'stand' alone as a social entity. Up is about power, status and (self-)control. Two vertical schemata are evoked: a mapping of socio-economic structure onto a vertical scale, and a mapping of personal socio-economic stability onto self-sustaining vertical bodily posture. OUT is about group membership: it appeals to the metaphoric understanding of a social group as a container or a bounded region. Non-acceptance or non-membership is exclusion from this container.

The first goal of the present paper, then, is to point out and delineate a noticeable correlation between mappings from the spatial domain to the relevant target domains: the same portion of society which is 'down' in the

hierarchy is likely to be 'out' on the periphery of the horizontal model. Status and social acceptance are strongly correlated in experience. Thus, within our model of society, one is not *down and in*, or *up and out*, although these might be reasonable ways to talk about the structure of a coal mine.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Johnson (1987) brought to the scholarly community's attention the pervasive and cognitively basic status of *orientational metaphors*. This term refers to a broad class of metaphors which map the language and conceptual structure of human bodily orientation onto a variety of abstract social and cognitive domains. Lakoff and Johnson's original example-set centres on metaphorical mappings of *UP* and *DOWN*, including *HAPPY IS UP* (cf. *I'm feeling low today*), *GOOD IS UP* (*high-minded behaviour*, *low-down tricks*), *CONSCIOUS IS UP* (*sink/fall into a coma*), *RATIONAL IS UP* (*raise the discussion to a rational level vs. let it sink to an emotional level*) and *POWER/STATUS IS UP* (*higher officials*, *low-level job*).

Crucially, I argue that these orientational structures are not randomly associated with each other. As Aristotle noticed, upwards, forwards and rightwards form a natural group for humans as opposed to down/back/left: these are all 'positive' directions linked with human interaction structure. We can see (hence monitor) and manipulate things in front of us, not things behind us; and in canonical communication, humans face each other (each 'in front of' the other). For the right-handed majority of humans, we interact better with the environment to the right of us than to the left, though this difference is less significant than the front/back one. Finally, when we are 'up', standing vertically, we have maximal mobility and control of our surroundings; control is also improved by being taller, or physically placed higher, than those around us; given the intervention of the ground cutting off our visual field, we also see further upwards than downwards, and we generally expect light to come from above, not from below.

None of these correlations are invariable in all human experience: the point is that they are invariable in our experience of certain salient and constantly relevant aspects of interaction with the world. Being *UP* is not always a means of gaining power and mobility: for someone being held high above the ground, poorly supported and afraid of falling, *UP* is a precarious position, while being down on the ground would be safer. This doesn't change the general experience of being more in control (once on the ground) when we can be erect and above the area or objects to be controlled.

A less inevitable but nonetheless strong correlation is my subject here, namely the grouping of *UP* with *IN* and *DOWN* with *OUT*, as in *down and out*: in particular, the correlation between the metaphorical mappings of *UP* and *IN*, and of *DOWN* and *OUT*, are pervasive in everyday English. I shall argue that a whole range of domains share this correlation between *UP* and *IN*. In many cases, our experience of the human body is the likeliest underlying motivation

for the *UP/IN* co-orientation; but our experience of other containers, such as houses, is also relevant. In particular, it is important to see that not only is co-orientation of metaphors of centrality/containment and verticality motivated by our experience of our physical selves, but it gives an essential coherence to a multiple and varied group of metaphorical models of self and society.

Having laid out this material, I shall progress to discussion of specific Shakespearean uses of these metaphors, and conclude with discussion of the relevance of this example for the relationship between linguistics and literary studies, and for the relationship of both to cognitive and social sciences. The kinds of variation and universals observed in language are crucial to our better understanding of human cognition; and the literary imaginative use of language is perhaps even more interesting in this regard.

THE UP/IN CO-ORIENTATION IN EVERYDAY LANGUAGE

The body as container and as self-sustained vertical structure

As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) and Johnson (1987) have argued, our bodies are inherently containers and are experienced as such. Not only do we eat and drink, urinate and excrete (filling and emptying our digestive tract), but when cut we bleed, emptying out an even more essential liquid. Further, our essential and vulnerable internal organs (brain, heart, lungs, etc.) are contained and protected by skin and flesh, and also by containers of bone: the skull, the rib-cage and the pelvis. The fingers and toes are unprotected, and although important are not essential to the continuing life of the whole body; nails and hair are at the far bodily periphery, and inessential to life. We thus experience our bodies both as containers of essential bodily fluids and internal organs, and as constituting a gradual cline from most central to most peripheral parts.

Further, it is a basic aspect of our bodily experience that we not only live in a gravitic environment (which identifies a vertical dimension) but have a canonical bodily stance within that environment: erect, vertically oriented. Maintaining this stance is normal and easy – though only when we are conscious and in control of our muscles and nervous system. And it's distinctive; humans are unlike cats or horses in having a canonical vertical stance on only two limbs. Further, in this canonical position, the head (containing the brain) is at the highest point of our bodies, and the major life-sustaining organs are all above the weight-bearing limbs (in particular, the heart is in the higher part of the trunk). Our legs, the lower half of our height, contain no internal organs, and in fact we can survive their loss; we cannot survive a similar amount of organic loss starting at the top of the body.

The structure of the human body thus gives us significant reasons to

correlate the upwards end of a vertical dimension with the inner part of a container structure, and the centre of a centre/periphery structure. Containment is not only coherent with centre/periphery structure, but even analysable as a subcase of it: a container defines and maintains a centre/periphery relationship, keeping the central contained area distinct from the peripheral area outside the container, and not allowing objects to cross the boundary. As we shall see, other experiential bases are added to these, in co-orienting verticality and centrality/containment. But we should never lose sight of this experiential 'bottom line':

Models of Self; sometimes 'higher' is 'more central'

Our daily understandings of our abstract selves have many dimensions: social, psychological, emotional, intellectual and moral, among others. But no matter what aspects of the structure of Self we examine, the linguistic forms used to describe it will include vocabulary drawn from the domains of verticality, centre/periphery structure and containment. In short, the language which describes the basic experience of physical selfhood will be metaphorically extended to describe the less concrete aspects of Self. And further, I claim, there will be co-orientation: the same aspects of self that tend to be mapped onto the upper end of the vertical scale will be mapped onto the centre and interior of the containment structure.

Let us begin with the centre/periphery and containment relations, as they are metaphorically mapped onto the concept of Self. First, as our internal organs and other essential body parts are generally central to our physical self, we have a basis for a metaphor ESSENTIAL IS CENTRAL. Since 'essential' means you can't do without it, essential things don't tend to change: they always have to be part of the whole, or the whole wouldn't be there. This correlation offers potential motivation for the mapping STABLE/UNCHANGING IS CENTRAL. Essential things are often causally prior to less essential parts of the same system. In this case, we might argue that the lungs, which are part of the same organism as the toes, are causally prior to the toes, since they oxygenate the blood which maintains the toes as living tissue, while the toes play no such necessary role in maintaining the lungs' existence. So we might add to ESSENTIAL IS CENTRAL a related corollary, CAUSALLY PRIOR IS MORE CENTRAL, CAUSALLY DEPENDENT IS MORE PERIPHERAL. And, since these essential organs are (precisely) by their central location in the body) protected and contained against damage to their essential functions, we might also say ESSENTIAL AND CAUSALLY PRIOR IS VULNERABLE AND CONTAINED, while INESSENTIAL AND CAUSALLY DEPENDENT IS EXTERIOR AND/OR CONTAINER.

Consider now our everyday folk understanding of abstract Self. As we think of some parts of our physical self as more essential than others, so also most

of us believe that some of our memories, relationships, emotions, beliefs, abilities, tastes and qualities are more important to defining our Selves than others. For example, I feel I'd still be pretty much 'the same person' had I shopped at a different supermarket yesterday. But I might be a radically different person if I had been brought up and educated in different places, or had not met my husband and instead had married someone else. Losing the memory of my wedding day would be a much greater loss of Self than forgetting the name of a subway stop. I can imagine 'myself' deciding it was immoral to eat meat, but I feel I would need to be a different person to believe that it was immoral for a woman to display her face, or moral for a husband to beat his wife. If I could hit a softball accurately, I'd be different; but not as significantly different as if I became unable to speak French, or to drive; which in turn are less essential to my Self than speaking English and walking.

In this understanding of Selfhood, certain aspects of me are totally essential, others less so, and others totally unimportant. The essential ones are likely to be long-lasting and to affect other aspects of my life and my self; the unimportant ones are likely to be more temporary and less causally pervasive. It is part of my self-understanding that my relationships with my family and close friends have affected my tastes, my choice of skills to develop, my emotional states and my moral values. Casual acquaintance relationships are less likely to affect my values – and 'peripheral' values are less likely to affect my human interactions (friends might agree to disagree about an unimportant value more readily than about one which they see as 'central').

Everyday language metaphorically treats this cline of essential-ness as a centre-periphery structure. We have *deeply held values*, *heart-felt* (or *deep*) *emotions*, *close relationships* (vs. *keeping someone at a distance*), and an exceptionally close person could be called *the centre of my life/existence*.⁶ A very *distant* acquaintance would only be *on the fringes* of my social world. Emotionally, I can be happy *through and through*, or *to the central core of my being*; politically, I can be a liberal *to the core*. All my most basic skills, tastes or experiences are CENTRAL ones, while unimportant ones are non-central, or PERIPHERAL.

Some of the centre-periphery metaphors involve containment as well; many of the uses of *deep* above probably reflect container structure. The many uses of IN and OUT to refer to aspects of Self are perhaps the most salient linguistic evidence for a container model of Self.

She stayed calm *on the outside*, but *inside* she burned with rage.

She has a staid *exterior*, but her sense of humour may *burst out* at any time.

Don't *keep me out*; I want to understand your feelings.

In my innermost heart, I feel that was wrong.⁷

Deep (down) inside, I trust you.

'*Deep in my heart*, I do believe that we shall overcome someday.'

'When Love comes knocking at your door, just open up and let it in.' (The Beattles)

Conscience is an *inner* voice which helps us make moral decisions. American bureaucracy was *outside* of her experience.

One important result (and use) of physical containment is to protect contents. Every time we put something fragile in a box, or store something fresh-washed in a drawer, or use a book with a protective binding, or lock a door, we use protective containers. We protect things because they are especially vulnerable to damage (crystal glasses) or especially important (legal documents), or both. And, as mentioned earlier, our bones and flesh also contain and protect our vital organs. All this is a potential experiential basis for the metaphorical mapping PROTECTION IS CONTAINMENT, wherein the thing contained maps onto the thing protected, and the container maps onto whatever is doing the protecting, while the outside forces or objects which might damage the contained thing map onto dangers which are warded off by protection.

In our understanding of Self, we see our strongest emotions as a source of vulnerability; anyone who affects them has an important (and potentially dangerous) effect on our whole psyche. We therefore try to allow only trusted people to affect these essential feelings, hoping they will not 'hurt' us psychologically.

ESSENTIAL EMOTIONAL SELF IS (FRAGILE, VALUABLE) CONTENTS OF A CONTAINER
 PROTECTIVE SOCIAL RESERVE IS THE CONTAINER
 TRUSTED FRIENDS ARE PEOPLE ALLOWED TO OPEN THE CONTAINER
 FEARED EMOTIONAL HURT IS FEARED DAMAGE OR LOSS OF CONTAINER'S CONTENTS

Assuming the contained SELF to be FRAGILE, this model also explains uses like:

I feel too *fragile* to open up emotionally yet.

Max is still all *broken up* about failing that test.

If you don't *put up some defences*, you'll be *hurt* too often.

(Here the protective container is a fortification.)

Anna felt emotionally *battered/shattered* by the court hearing.

(Here the vulnerable emotional self is seen as a damageable human body.)

Containers limit, as well as protecting their contents. Essentially, they keep things in, as well as keeping things out. Liquids are contained for both kinds of reasons: we don't want the milk in the bottle wasted, or dirty, and we don't want the surroundings covered with milk. Doors may be locked to keep intruders out or prisoners in. The limits of our Selves are also metaphorically described in terms of containment:

COMPETENCE and CONTROL are BOUNDED (CONTAINED) AREAS.
 EVENTS OR ENTITIES WE DO NOT CONTROL ARE OBJECTS LOCATED OUTSIDE THOSE AREAS.

EVENTS AND ENTITIES WE DO CONTROL ARE OBJECTS LOCATED INSIDE THOSE AREAS.

Other works, such as Reddy (1979) and Sweetser (1984, 1990, 1992) have argued that everyday language pervasively reflects the following additional metaphors, not treated in detail here for lack of space:

KNOWING IS HOLDING OBJECTS

REASONING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS.

UNKNOWN OR UN-UNDERSTOOD INFORMATION IS OBJECTS WE DON'T HOLD.

UNKNOWNABLE INFORMATION IS OBJECTS WE WILL NEVER HOLD, OR CAN'T HOLD.

Our knowledge and comprehension are thus examples of bounded areas of control: information we know/understand is already *within our grasp*, and information we might be able to get is *within our reach*.

That is *within* my area of expertise.

Such cases are entirely *outside* my experience.

Their department politics is complex *beyond* belief.

Beyond/outside of my control, authority

Within my ability, comprehension

Overall, then, we regularly use the vocabulary of our body's physical centre-periphery and container structure to refer to the structure of our psychological, moral and intellectual abstract selves. But this is not the only set of metaphors we use for Abstract Self, as we shall see.

Verticality and Self; when is 'higher' also 'more central'?

What does it mean to say that language, or rational thought, is the *highest* function of the human mind? And why might one also call language, or rationality, the *central* defining characteristic of humanity? Let's examine some of the ways in which hierarchy is mapped onto our understanding of Self, and how that mapping is co-oriented with the centre/periphery and containment mappings.

RATIONALITY IS UP, PASSION IS DOWN (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980)

The discussion sank to an emotional plane, but I brought it back up to a rational level.

She rose above her feelings and acted reasonably.

Reason is what puts us *higher than (above)* the apes.

GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980)

Things that improve us *raise* us; corrupting things *lower* us.

She regards marijuana use as the *depths* of depravity.

I didn't think they'd *sink* to such a *low-down* trick.

His *high* principles saved him from corruption.

The Victorians put upper-class wives on a *pedestal*.

An *elevating* sermon can change lives.

Thus, among emotions (passions), GOOD EMOTIONS are HIGHER THAN BAD ONES, and GOOD EMOTIONS RAISE US, BAD ONES LOWER US:

Love is an *elevating* sentiment.

Distrust *lowers* (*degrades*) the suspicious person's moral character.

Generosity means being *above* rivalry.

Jealousy is a *low*, petty feeling.

The *highest* form of love is selfless.

How are these vertical mappings related to the centre/periphery and containment mappings seen above? First of all, both centre/periphery and verticality are mapped onto CONTROL: CONTROL IS CENTRALITY and CONTROL IS UP. Second, morality is mapped onto centre-periphery as well as onto control, via the normative aspects of self-definition. How many of us would feel comfortable saying, even to ourselves, that hate, or vice, was *the centre of our lives*? How much easier to imagine saying that love, or good principles, are *central* to our social and moral being! We think of the best aspects of ourselves as more important and essential and permanent, at least in determining our goals (if not our actual behaviour), while our less good qualities are unimportant, peripheral and temporary (or accidental). In saying that we *identify with our best selves*, we mean that we define ourselves in terms of moral norms, excluding and peripheralizing the aspects of ourselves which we prefer to consider as (1) non-definitional of our identity and (2) not controlling our behaviour. The former are (normatively at least) the same moral qualities which are HIGHER on the GOOD IS UP vertical mapping.

A further relevant norm is the everyday understanding that good moral qualities and good emotions *should* ideally (if not always actually) *dominate* vices and less admirable emotions. 'Perfect love casts out fear': that is, it both dominates and excludes it. So Love is not only HIGHER than Jealousy because it is more morally admirable, but because it should ideally be a STRONGER force, dominating the bad side of our psyche. GOOD IS UP at least partly because it is supposed to be victorious over Evil. Once again, the same parts of our moral and emotional selves which are supposed to be central are also mapped onto the UP end of the vertical scale.

Rationality is likewise UP, compared to emotion in general; not only is it considered better to be reasonable than to be emotional, but it shows more self-CONTROL (control is UP). Also, as mentioned earlier, rationality is seen as paired with our vertical erect posture (and our head-above-body primate

physical structure) in setting us apart as superior to the animals. Animals may experience emotions (at least lower ones, like fear), but lack Reason. We clearly identify with rationality, when we say that being rational is being *self-controlled*, while being emotional is being *out of control*. (If we let our emotions control us, we do not call them our Self.) Reason therefore should be (i.e. normatively is) in control over emotion.

Verticality, as well as centre-periphery and containment, is thus a central aspect of our understanding of the structure of Self. And there are important experiential reasons why the two metaphorical understandings of Self are co-oriented, so that the aspects of Self referred to with the vocabulary of centrality are the same aspects which are mapped onto the upper end of a vertical metaphor for Self.

Centrality, verticality and cultural models of society

Most of our models of society involve some idea of hierarchy, and in general the most basic metaphor for hierarchy is verticality. The experiential correlations between CONTROL and UP (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) are deep and important. So metaphorical expressions like the following are common, and well recognized: they exemplify a general understanding of SOCIAL STATUS OR POWER IS CLOSENESS TO THE TOP OF A VERTICAL STRUCTURE.

lower class, upper class, upward mobility

A marquis is one rank *higher* than an earl.

You need education to *rise* in our economic structure.

The *upper crust* of Boston society is made up of Old Families.

That job is *below* her social expectations.

Individual social institutions have the same HIERARCHY IS VERTICALITY mapping.

Freshmen are the *bottom* of the social heap in college.

Permission came *down* from the *upper* levels of the administration.

Long-term unemployment can create a permanent *underclass*.

Social stability is often partly maintained by resistance to changes in individual social status; thus difficulties in changing status are mapped onto barriers to motion along the vertical dimension.

*glass ceiling**

Regional accents can be a *barrier* to upwards mobility.

So far, we have not differentiated between social and economic structure – indeed, our folk model of class structure may be best viewed as socio-economic. However, certain usages do apply particularly to one or the other: an *economic safety-net* (such as welfare) is intended to provide some security

against *falling too far down* the economic scale, but this phrase cannot refer to mechanisms for avoiding loss of social class position. Combining this vertical model of social structure with other metaphors such as UP IS PUBLIC or UP IS ACCESSIBLE TO CONSCIOUSNESS (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), we can see why the criminal world, being both socially stigmatized and covert, would be described as the *underworld*.

Centrality/containment is also pervasive as a model of society, and easily recognizable in everyday linguistic usage. SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE (or positive social position) IS CENTRALITY, and SOCIAL REJECTION (or negative social position) IS PERIPHERALITY OR EXCLUSION. Assuming that (as with the vertical hierarchy model), resistance to changes in social position will be metaphorically understood as physical barriers to movement in the centre-periphery structure, we see why exclusion is part of the model. Physical exclusion is precisely the state of being prevented from moving to the inside of a container from the outside: and a container's centre is always inside it. In other words, exclusion is maintenance of peripherality via barriers. Here are some examples of social structure metaphors:

'In' group, *outcast*

Did anyone feel *left out* by the wording of the invitation?

It's easy to feel *marginalized* as a minority student on a big campus.

He was a *peripheral* member of that department.

The *core* members of the teaching staff are ...

Fraternities are no longer allowed to *exclude* minority members.

Social acceptance depends, among other things, on following social norms and obeying laws and customs. Usages such as *outlaw* reflect the idea that by disobeying the law you leave the metaphorical social container, and thus lose the protection that container affords. If you are 'outside the law', you are not limited by social rules, but you are also no longer protected by them.

The idea of PHYSICAL DISTANCE as representing DEGREE OF SOCIAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL INTIMACY is a basic structuring principle of our language for social relations. This metaphor is based on an important correlation: babies develop emotional connection with caregivers through physical cuddling, and as adults we prefer to keep some physical distance from people who are not emotionally intimate with us. The final, complete stage of physical proximity is union or identity, where there are no longer two distinguishable physical objects adjacent to each other, but only a single object occupying a single location. Strangers and enemies are thus FAR from the Self, friends and family NEAR to Self (the more intimate the nearer); a spouse may even be seen as metaphorically united or co-located with Self.

Mutual INFLUENCE is obviously a salient characteristic of closeness, as the

metaphorical model would predict. Entities in physical proximity can interact and causally influence each other; distant ones generally cannot. Emotionally 'close' people influence each other's mental states and reasoning processes, while emotionally 'distant' ones do not. Moral decisions and deliberations are a part of this potentially shared mental self, the realm of interpersonal influence.

Thus, in our *social sphere*, there is a centre (Ego) and a gradual attrition through an area near the centre towards a periphery and an outside. As discussed above, the same is true of our psyche itself: it has more and less 'central' aspects. Certain important mental states are only to be shared with people who are important in our social world. Peripheral members of our social sphere see only the periphery of our Self, while people close to us see more of our 'central' identity.

Privacy and exclusion of outsiders from Self is based precisely on the model of mutual influence mentioned above. Closeness permits influence; where influence is not desired, we set up barriers to prevent proximity. Closing your study door may prevent people from rearranging your desk; locked doors and windows may prevent physically dangerous people from entering your house. If you fear or dislike someone's social or psychological influence, then you can refuse to allow them to become sufficiently intimate with you to hurt or influence the central core of your social or psychological self. There are objects so fragile, or so valuable, that we routinely keep them inaccessibly contained (in a bank vault or museum case); for these objects, the assumption is that *most* contact would be damaging or dangerous. Similarly, certain parts of our psyche are so vulnerable, or so treasured and special, that we allow them to be accessed only by a few trusted people, and routinely exclude other comers. Other parts are only hidden from people we have active cause to distrust. In any case, our Self is not only seen as a structure involving a centre and periphery, but also as involving protective barriers which maintain that centre/periphery structure so as to shield the centre from intrusion.⁹

These examples are typical of the broad-based use of centrality/peripherality and containment/exclusion vocabulary to talk about both the structure of society at large and the structure of our personal social relationships. As with our models of Self, for our models of Society at large, there is considerable overlap between the aspects we regard as CENTRAL and those we regard as UPPER. Social position depends both on POWER and on ACCEPTANCE, and the two are interrelated. The *central* (more widely accepted) government is also *higher* (more powerful) than local governments. Socially unpopular people may be said to be *at the bottom of the high-school social heap* or *not part of the In group*. We have mentioned the ways in which both verticality and centrality correlate with our bodily experience of control. In human-built environments, where physical barriers like walls and doors are

created for the maintenance of social privacy, children must learn early that containment and centrality also correlate with social acceptance. Acceptance correlates with power as well; who can doubt this, seeing the 'exclusive' status conferred by penthouses and top-floor offices in skyscrapers?

A LITERARY EXAMPLE: PORTIA'S USE OF CO-ORIENTED METAPHORS

The problem passage: what this analysis needs to resolve about the text

I now turn to a particular literary passage's usage of these pervasive cognitive and linguistic metaphoric mappings, arguing that the co-orientation of vertical and in/out metaphors for self and society allows them to work together to create a uniquely strong literary effect. At the risk of reiterating what has already been well stated by Lakoff and Turner (1989), among others, it is worthy of remark how completely the artistry of the passage in question builds on the mundane metaphorical structures discussed above – not to mention how evidently these modern structures are shared by a literary work several centuries old.

In Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* (2.1), Portia has a well-known dialogue with Brutus, begging him to explain his depressed and disturbed behaviour. The audience knows that Brutus is harassed by moral uncertainty over his plan to kill Caesar. Although he finally agrees to confide in Portia, they are apparently interrupted before he does so by the arrival of Caius Ligarius, with whom Brutus leaves to join in the murder. Ineffectual though Portia's pleas appear to be in determining the course of the plot, a metaphorical analysis of this conversation reveals an ideal moral structure which is not instantiated in the play's events. However, it is partially instantiated in many of Brutus' actions in particular, and its presence changes the moral understanding of the events at large. The metaphorical structure in question centres on Portia's use of the city as a model for society and the individual, using both the physical centre/periphery and containment relations and the vertical dimension of the physical city to represent social and moral structure. I argue that the scene in fact consists of a metaphorical structuring (or restructuring) of Brutus' self and social world in terms of these two metaphorical models, but that this restructuring ultimately fails; the ensuing moral breakdown constitutes the tragic development of the play.

Julius Caesar presents major interpretive challenges, most of all with respect to the morality of the characters and their actions. Shakespeare's Caesar is a dangerously arrogant figure, oblivious of his own human frailty (a recognized flaw in a Renaissance ruler); and modern readers may concur with Brutus and with many classical authors in deploring the end of the historical

Roman Republic. However, Elizabethan culture, being strongly centred on monarchy, did not glorify republicans as we tend to. Caesar's killers are depicted as violent and (except for Brutus) self-interested. They loose murder and civil war in the name of 'Peace, freedom and liberty!' (3.1.110). Antony, who appears to honestly love Caesar, brings 'justice' on the murderers by a now proverbially dishonest piece of rhetoric, and thus incites the mob to further murder (not just of conspirators). The common people, potential heroes of a republican dream or objects of sympathy in a civil war, are portrayed as violent and unthinking, easily manipulated to their own and society's destruction. Brutus, with whom we sympathize the most, has exceptional personal integrity; this very quality tips the scales against his better self, since he naively interprets Cassius' and others' words as being based on a similar integrity. This is a thoroughly modern play, if modernity means that we cannot separate heroes from villains, innocence from guilt, or even truth from falsity.

On the other hand, *Julius Caesar* is anything but an amoral play. Personal morality is constantly at issue, and remains the most serious theme despite the political and social themes interwoven with it. Nor do we feel that positive morality is absent; the tragedy is not its absence, but its failure. Confusion, not vice and hypocrisy, is Brutus' damnation.¹⁰

And yet it is not easy to pin down the positive morality of this play, even if its presence is felt. The message is surely not a simple one. Murder, revolution and civil war are clearly condemned as evils; but Shakespeare also makes it clear that once a civil war is started nobody can avoid involvement in killing. And he nowhere answers the question of what one substitutes for revolution, in the face of an unjust rule (a politic silence, in a world where monarchy was seen as divinely ordained: Elizabeth I had been annoyed by Shakespeare's earlier portrayal of Richard II's deposition).¹¹ The end to civil strife is a good, likewise: yet the audience must feel profound irony when Octavius refers to 'this happy day' in the last line (5.5.81), while standing next to Brutus' dead body. Octavius, the victor and restorer of moral and political order, is less sympathetic and less morally admirable than Brutus: he is both vengeful¹² and ambitious, so that it is not clear that the civil war has ended 'happily'.¹³

How, then, does positive morality find a basis? What gives coherence to a moral being – for example, what links Brutus' integrity to his kindness (e.g. to his servant) and to his eventual suicide (seen here with more of a sympathetic Roman eye than a disapproving Christian one)? What might have led to a morally better sequence of events at the social and political level?

Some part of an answer to these moral questions is found in Brutus' deliberation with Portia. At this crucial point in the play's structure, Brutus has essentially committed himself to the conspirators, but has not yet acted on that commitment. He is 'Between the acting of a dreadful thing/ and the first motion' (2.1.63–4). It is the final chance for clearer moral vision, for a change

of heart or mind. Once the murder is committed, clear moral hindsight will inevitably become available – too late. My argument is that Brutus' and Portia's conversation, if metaphorically analysed, epitomizes the positive moral direction which might have led elsewhere. Here at the play's moral pivot, we have a potential foothold for a structure of moral coherence.

The scene itself is somewhat puzzling. Although Brutus ends up agreeing to confide in Portia, they apparently are prevented from finishing their conversation. So in fact she is told nothing, and her guesses influence neither Brutus' decision nor the course of events. Someone interested exclusively in the forward motion of the plot might conclude that this scene was there to show *lack* of forward motion, or even to give variety to a play nearly devoid of female characters (and thus of roles for the actors who played them). Others, interested in character, might say more insightfully that Brutus gets a chance to show his full emotional depth in his interaction with Portia. This is both true, and crucially related to the moral depth which is simultaneously laid bare. The unfinished conversation with Portia is an unfinished deliberation with himself, and a poignantly near miss at moral synthesis. A look at the metaphors shows the identity of the missed synthesis.

Who's talking? The understanding of Self

Portia invokes Brutus' confidence 'by right and virtue of my place' (2.1.269) and 'by that great vow which did incorporate and make us one' (2.1.271–2). By incorporation, she means union into the 'one flesh' of marriage.¹⁴ Marriage makes a permanent metaphorical and spiritual link out of the temporary physical joining of sexual intercourse. The physical sexual *relationship* involved in marriage is presumed to be lifelong rather than temporary, and that relationship is metonymically identified with the activity of physical sexual union which centrally defines it and is sanctioned by it. This is accompanied by what is ideally a lifelong spiritual relationship of intimacy. There is, and was in Elizabethan as well as in Roman times, a legal as well as a physical and spiritual 'union of persons' in marriage: I can file a joint income tax form with my husband, while an Elizabethan married woman could not take independent legal action (although a widow might). So Portia appropriately calls herself 'your self, your half' (2.1.274) and later asks indignantly 'Am I your self / But, as it were, in sort or limitation' (i.e. in a restricted way) (2.1.282–3). She enumerates what this limited union of selves consists of: bed, board and occasional conversation, without true shared confidence. She claims the right of a genuine union, the moral right to be Brutus' 'self' and share in his moral difficulties.

The idea of marriage as *union* of persons is the ultimate example of the idea of social distance being metaphorically represented as physical distance.¹⁵ Sexual union involves physical penetration of bodily containers, making them

not fully distinct: social union in marriage merges two social entities to make them indistinct in certain conventional respects. Brutus has, under this metaphorical analysis, wronged himself as much as Portia; his entire Self should have been involved in making crucial moral decisions.

Further, in this scene Portia clearly represents not just a random 'half' of Brutus, but a particular part of his psychological self. In a preceding monologue, Brutus likened his own microcosmic human state to 'a little kingdom' (2.1.68) which is suffering 'an insurrection' (2.1.69). (In an important parallel between the models of Self and Society represented, he is of course planning a literal revolution in the real kingdom of Rome, plotting with co-conspirators.) The Elizabethans regularly viewed the human psyche as a metaphorical kingdom, peopled by the faculties and the humours. Brutus says, in particular, that 'the genius' (Reason) and the 'mortal instruments' (faculties of mind and body, normally governed by reason) are then 'in council' (2.1.67–8) – and the balance of power is apparently at stake, in this attempted psychological coup d'état.

If Brutus' internal 'insurrection' potentially indicated a need for intervention, I claim that Portia is here a forceful voice of Brutus' Reason (a female goddess, the Latin noun *Ratio* being feminine). *Ratio* is striving to resume her proper ruling place among his faculties, and speaks via the female 'half' of him, his wife.¹⁶ This reading is supported first by her comments on his unreasonable behaviour: he does not eat or sleep (2.1.252) (or, we gather, make love to his wife)¹⁷ or keep himself warmly clothed on a cold night (2.1.262), and he does not reply when spoken to (2.1.240ff.) or interact with people normally in general. In short, he is not behaving like a being whose physical needs are governed by rationality, and whom rationality endows with speech (essential mark of Reason) and thus makes social. She initially attributes this to a temporary imbalance of the Humours (a physical indisposition or a psychological mood), but finally has decided that it is a more severe mental imbalance, or he would be trying to cure his physical illness. As she says, 'Brutus is wise, and were he not in health, / He would embrace the means to come by it' (2.1.258–9).

Lest we view a human female as an insufficient voice for Reason (a centrally male characteristic to the Elizabethans, although possessed by all humans), Portia presents further arguments: she shows that she has subordinated her physical self (her emotions and bodily impulses) to her rational will by giving herself a voluntary wound in the thigh. Modern readers may find it hard to take this as a sign of rationality, but it is; it is also a sign of *fortitude*, another canonically masculine virtue.¹⁸ Portia argues that she is a special woman, and that their marital union of souls should therefore not only be closer than is usual, but more equal. Finally, as Brutus' wife, invoking his marriage vow as her argument (as well as all his past vows of love), Portia

represents Love, the highest moral virtue and the one from which all the others are supposed to follow. Hatred and violence should be ruled by love and reason.¹⁹

This, then, is the model of the moral self underlying Portia's argument for marital confidence. The Self is a hierarchically (*vertically*) arranged society, wherein the faculties should be properly ordered under Reason as their ruler. The Self should be unified, as well as ordered and balanced: division within the Self is an analogous danger to civil war (the latter being a central theme of the play; Brutus remarks numerous times on the dangers of division). Balance, order and unity are all partly achieved by hierarchy: Reason will assure that no individual humour or passion is allowed to dominate all the others, but that their balance results in mental and physical health. Morality and divine love will be in agreement with reason (at least with divine reason!), so harmony will be assured. To make a wise decision, Brutus needs to be in this state, which Portia wants to help him reach.

Centre and periphery: identity and morality

In pleading for Brutus to trust her and identify her strongly with himself, Portia uses a crucial metaphor to express the centre/periphery structure of Self. She says: 'Dwell I but in the *suburbs* / Of your good pleasure?' (2.1.285-6). Before we examine the vertical relationships implied in this remark, let us first consider the Renaissance or Roman city as a model of the centre-periphery structure of Self. First, the suburbs of such a town might well be not just peripheral, but outside the city walls, beyond a defensive barrier from the central administrative and religious buildings. Illegal and unprotected businesses concentrated in the suburbs; thus Shakespeare's audience was not surprised by Portia's next remark: 'If it be no more, / Portia is Brutus' harlot, not his wife' (2.1.286-7). The brothels were in the suburbs in ancient Pompeii and in Renaissance London. If Brutus as a social being is compared to a physical defended city, then his peripheral relationships are in the suburbs, outside the wall, while his central human relationships correspond to the central part of the city.

This imposes a moral and legal, as well as social, structure on the relationship between Brutus and Portia. It is not by chance that palaces and temples and legal courts are often in the centre of a city, while (in these cities) the brothels are peripheral. Law-abiding and religious citizens are the norm and the prototype; Law and Religion and Morality are essential principles of social structure. Those who conform to these norms are central members of Society, and those who do not are at the periphery, beyond the sphere of control of Law and Religion. Immoral elements, far from being central, are damaging to the social structure, and are to be kept outside society and

excluded; thus the moral and law-abiding elements are preserved from contact with immorality and illegality. CONTAINMENT and EXCLUSION are part of the centre/periphery metaphor, as subcases involving MAINTENANCE of the existing centre/periphery structure by construction of barriers. Thus legality and morality are desirable and internal and protected by barriers, while the illegal and immoral are external and undesirable and kept out by barriers.²⁰

A moral person identifies with morality and legality, and excludes from Self immoral and illegal things. Similarly, a man's relationship with his wife is central to his social and moral Self, publicly recognized, legally sanctioned, and is (symbolic of Union) carried on within their shared residence, the physical centre of their lives. His relationship with a prostitute is peripheral to his Self (unimportant, not publicly acknowledged). It is excluded from the home, precisely to exclude immorality and illegality from the Self. Love is admitted and central, lust is excluded and peripheral.

Portia thus accuses Brutus of having relegated her to a marginal moral and legal status by having denied her social and emotional closeness. He is essentially 'wise' and 'honourable' as we keep on being told.²¹ These are unchangeable characteristics; later in the play we are told that Brutus, even dead, will be found 'like himself' (5.4.25). If he refuses Portia his intimacy, there should be some reason. One might exclude a spouse from physical intimacy because of physical sexual infidelity; exclusion from mental intimacy would presumably be justified by mental unworthiness: disloyalty, weakness, lack of intelligence or lack of affection, for example. Portia is a wife in every way worthy of Brutus, and refuses to be treated as a peripheral adjunct to his moral self.

Verticality: morality and self in a different dimension

Although modern suburbs are no longer the walled-out location of brothels, but often the residence of respectable and successful citizens, a modern reader can still understand that Portia is claiming to be given a *peripheral* status in Brutus' life. What the modern reader may not immediately perceive is that the same metaphor can be interpreted as giving her a LOWER status. The 'suburbs' of a defended city were genuinely a *sub-urbs*, an under-city or lower city, *below* the walls of the defended area (which was often centred on a hill or hills, as in Rome). In Rome, for reasons of safety and centrality alike, temples and law-courts and respectable citizens' homes were located on the defended hilltops, while brothels ended up in the lowlands under the city walls. Although London was not a defended hill city, English Renaissance audiences would have been familiar with such defended towns.

Morality, as described above, is metaphorically conceived of in terms of vertical relationships: good is up, bad is down. In this respect, the centre/periphery model of morality and the up/down model are perfectly

coherent with each other: the central elements of a defended city are also the higher parts, the peripheral parts are the lower parts. The morally and socially superior elements of society are located both centrally and at the top of the physical structure. The physical structure thus parallels both social hierarchy (the city's authorities and upper class lived in the defended higher areas) and moral hierarchy (legal and religious authority, and legal businesses, were on those hilltops, brothels and highwaysmen's haunts were down outside the wall).

Portia is using the city in fact as a model of Brutus' Self, more than as a model of society, but as we have mentioned, Society is itself a metaphor for Self. And it is partly as social entity that the city is a model for Brutus. Within the Self, the *higher* self is the moral and virtuous aspects of being (including Love), as well as the rational ones; the *lower* self is the passions and the immoral or violent feelings (hatred, lust, greed, jealousy, vengefulness...). This hierarchy at least partially concerns control, as well as morality *per se*. Up is not only GOOD, UP is also power and control, while DOWN is subjection and impotence. Ideally, not only are our moral and rational selves better than our 'lower' selves, our 'higher' values also CONTROL our 'baser instincts'. Reason and virtue are the natural rulers over passion and vice. Rational Man is the natural ruler over non-rational animals in the traditional Great Chain of Being. Similarly, the more rational Man is the natural ruler over the weaker and more passion-dominated Woman. God, the ultimate Good, is also the ultimate Ruler, and highest on the Chain of Being. Portia comes to Brutus as emissary of these higher powers, including (as his spouse, invoking his love and his marriage vows) Love.

The Renaissance view of world order was as a meritocracy in the crucial sense outlined above. God is better than humans, humans *are* better than animals and so on. Ideally, rulers should also be morally superior to those ruled, and husbands to wives, and judges to those judged. Of course, Shakespeare knows that's not always true; indeed, major deviations from this pattern (like evil rulers) spell disaster precisely because they are disruptions of the divine pattern of the universe, and inherently unnatural. Reason, morality and (divine or human) love are naturally in command over unreason, immorality and hatred.

Portia is thus accusing Brutus of placing her not in her due position (just below him, if not with him) as a moral, rational, loving and even *noble* human being, who is married to him by a moral and legal bond, but instead in the place of some immoral, lustful, ignoble woman who is far below him socially and morally and who has no moral union with him. (She reminds us that her father was Cato, a notable moralist – 'like parent, like offspring' (cf. Turner, 1987) – and furthermore that her rationality and fortitude, proven with the voluntary wound, give her extra rights to be high on the Great Chain.) She is asking to have moral order restored. If Brutus' reason were ruling his humours,

he would be 'gentle' (kindly, but also *noble*) enough to recognize this order, as he calls her 'gentle' (2.1.278–9). She thus wants to assume her correct place in the world's vertical scheme – adjacent to Brutus – and restore order to the world at large and to Brutus' own disordered mind. In order to do this, she also wants to assume her proper place in the centre-periphery structure of Brutus' social world: at the centre.

Coherence

Brutus responds to Portia with a shocked assurance that she is right, that she is 'my true and honorable wife, / As dear to me as are the ruddy drops / That visit my sad heart' (2.1.288–90). The heart is the central organ of the body's circulatory system, its blood the primary necessity for physical existence and life. Its physical centrality and its organically essential status together make it the perfect metaphor for the most central part of Self. Portia is equally central to him, socially and psychologically – and morally, as the words *true and honorable* attest. Finally, after she brings forward the fact of the voluntary wound, he gives in entirely, and cries out 'O ye gods, / Render me worthy of this noble wife!' (2.1.302–3). No longer does Portia have to prove her worth; she is so exceptional that he needs to be an exceptionally moral man to be the appropriate husband, directly above her in the Chain. He acknowledges that he has been transgressing the moral order.

As noted above, it is usual to share your internal mental states with those close to you, not with those who are not your intimates. Further societal principles govern the flow of information: in particular, information is a resource which confers power on the possessor (cf. Sweetser, 1987). Power should (as mentioned above) be given to those who are morally reponsible, so moral people should be better receptacles of information than immoral ones. Certain particular kinds of information, such as 'top' secrets or inside trade information, should remain hidden from all who are not HIGH enough and CENTRAL enough in the relevant societal structure. Brutus' plan is highly secret, momentous and potentially dangerous; and its execution is also endangered by knowledge coming into the wrong hands. Portia is not only secure because she will not knowingly harm Brutus, but also because she has the higher understanding of herself and control of herself which will prevent her from doing so even under deception or coercion. She is therefore in every way 'within' the boundary of Brutus' confidences.

In one reading of this scene, then, Portia and Brutus coexist for a moment in a world where they acknowledge each other as moral equals and halves of a whole. In this world, moreover, Brutus is his full and true self: he is 'gentle Brutus'. The couple's very positions on stage are iconic (and of course metaphorical) for their re-established relationship. As Brutus asks the gods to

render him worthy of her, Portia is now almost certainly standing, hand-in-hand with him, if not in his arms. Earlier (2.1. 278) he urged her to rise from kneeling (vertically below him) on the floor opposite him (while she complained that he had left her bed, and later pushed her away from him; 2.1.237-47). The vertical and horizontal structure of Brutus' mind and world have been successfully reordered. His passions and baser instincts (even his fears) are duly governed by morality and reason and divine love (as represented by marital love), as his physical humours are balanced in health. He belongs to a society wherein morality and reason (assumed to be in agreement) are the characteristics of rulers, and where only the mob is brutal and unreasoning. Love is central, and higher than fear.

We never find out what might have happened if the conversation had continued, if Brutus had reconsidered the murder plot in this frame of mind, rather than under Cassius' deceptive influence and that of his own fears.

The murder will be neither moral nor rational. Despite Brutus' attempts to keep the conspirators high-minded and non-vindictive, they are all 'lowered' by violence, hatred and confusion. Before the actual deed, they deceptively bow to Caesar and beg him to change a judgement: even Brutus prostrates himself, physically lowers himself (3.1.33-57). Antony says later (5.1.41-4) 'You showed your teeth like apes, and fawned like hounds, / And bowed like bondmen, kissing Caesar's feet, / And damned Casca, like a cur, behind / Struck Caesar on the neck.' These nobles were animal-like, slave-like, like the mob, not their highest noble and rational selves.

Brutus has more potential for full humanity than the others. He is recognized even by Antony (ironically in the speech to the crowd, seriously in the final scene after his death) as honourable and noble. We see that he is honest, kindly (towards his servants, for example), loving and loyal (he is devoted to Portia; and his only boast is that his friends have always been loyal to him, 5.5.35) and courageous (he does not fear death). He is also ruled by his reason and morals in general: he is from the first upset by the idea of resorting to violence, and (once he agrees to the murder plot) it is he who keeps the conspirators from killing Antony and others as well as Caesar (2.1.154-91).²² He is indeed so saliently rational and self-controlled that (as a stunned Cassius realizes, 4.3.144-8) only Portia's death manages to break Brutus' courtesy and control of his temper. His lapse from the divinely ordained ideal of humanity is thus a greater tragedy than the other conspirators' deeds.

The existence of this recognized order makes the rest of the play sadder, since most of the play concerns violations of the world's and Man's divinely ordered natures. But it also makes us take Brutus' goodness as important and real, and keeps the play from being ultimately cynical. At the end of John Ford's *'Tis Pity She's a Whore*, a corrupt old prelate acts as moral arbiter and delivers an encomium on the tragedy of the heroine Annabella's moral lapse:

it is her excellence that makes her fall so tragic. This is cynicism, a biting parody of real moral resolution at the end of a true tragedy, because nothing in the play has made us think that Ford really believes in the existence of goodness,²³ and we know the prelate does not value morality in his own life. Annabella's fall is the way of the world. Brutus' fall is not: it is therefore tragic, because it might have been so different.

Most crucially, in a fully cynical work, not only is there no possibility of effectual positive morality, but negative morality is ultimately ineffectual too; if the world is evil no matter what, then what blame can really be put on specific human decisions? But it is Brutus' lapse that causes the Body Politic to be sick with civil war, and ultimately causes his death. If we really believe this, then we must take seriously the play's indications of the alternate possibility for effectual goodness, grounded in a healthy Body Politic and a healthy human psyche. As Antony says of Brutus, the elements were 'so mixed' in him (arranged in such a way) that his humanity was a prototype for the category ('nature might stand up / And say to all the world, "this was a man"; 5.5.73-5).

In this reading, it is Portia who builds for us the positive moral structure that is the fabric of real tragedy in *Julius Caesar*, by showing us a moral vision of wholeness and order, for the individual soul and for Society. And she builds her structure on the interaction of vertical and centre-periphery metaphors which form our everyday understanding of (and language for) psychological and social experience.

Do we have to believe a reading like mine, to be fascinated and impressed by *Julius Caesar* as a play? Surely not. In particular, we don't have to believe in the validity of the expressed Elizabethan moral model of society. Shakespeare has left us plenty of room to question any meritocratic or aristocratic model. Neither Caesar nor the Roman upper class is presented as being a moral example worthy of emulation, though Brutus himself may be in some respects. And we are given no concrete suggestions as to what exactly Brutus could have done differently. Is Brutus' tragedy really a personal one, lying in his betrayal of his own ideals in murdering Caesar? Or is it a societal one as well, lying in the breakdown of a social order – and precisely rooted in the morally inadequate leadership of that order? Or both? Could Brutus have prevented civil war? As often happens in real life, we don't know. Was Rome 'better' when electively governed, or under the Empire? Shakespeare offers no answer, though different readers have surely had strong opinions about this.

Whichever of these readings we follow (and an individual reader may adopt more than one), we are still making use of correlated up-down and in-out models of selfhood and social structure to understand the text. And we still have potential access to Portia's attempt to create a single coherent social and moral model of this kind – whether or not we agree with her, and whether or

not we think Shakespeare may have ultimately agreed with her. The problematic moral status of these complex models of Self and Society is what is at stake throughout the play, and what makes the play so essentially moral, even though it rarely provides moral judgements.

WHERE IS ALL THIS GOING? THOUGHTS ON METAPHOR, EMBODIMENT AND CULTURE

Almost every time I discuss bodily bases for human conceptual structures, metaphorical or otherwise, someone sensibly asks me how I could really believe such a story, given the amazing cross-cultural variety of such metaphorical models. How can I think, in the face of all this evidence, that the human body programmes us inevitably to some single shared set of models of the world? The Whorfian issue raises its head with respect to our own cultural past as much with respect as to other contemporary cultures.

The answer is that I do and do not believe that our neural systems lead us to share a worldview and a conceptual system. Yes, I see the embodied human neural system as inevitably more likely to extract certain kinds of categories than others from the world (so do all psychologists, though Eleanor Rosch's work is particularly relevant here³⁴). Yes, human children take colour terms as meaning the kinds of colour categories they can perceive³⁵ (and any human language therefore names a subset of such colour categories), humans use human visual and tactile boundaries in defining object-boundaries; and so on. Can we draw a tidy boundary between these presumably cross-culturally shared tendencies and the radically variable kinds of models cultural anthropologists have noted in comparing cultural understanding of social institutions, for example? It would be nice to think so, and to finish by saying that we can put phenomena into boxes depending on how body-related they are, and that will predict how culturally invariant they are. But of course that's far too simplistic. Not only do cultures vary in basic strategies towards spatial cognition,³⁶ but they also have widely differing models of other evidently bodily related domains such as sexuality, as evidenced by different cultural ideas about gender and marriage.

What does seem reasonable to say is that the more universal the experiential correlation on which a metaphorical mapping is based, the more likely the metaphor is to be universal. The Ego-centred temporal mappings FUTURE IS AHEAD OF EGO and PAST IS BEHIND EGO (as in *the weeks ahead* or *the years behind us*) are based, for example, on the correlation between the knowledge that a point is ahead or behind of a human moving on a path, and the knowledge that that location is to be encountered in the future or was encountered in the past. This does not mean that there are no other possible

ways of looking at time metaphorically, nor that every culture must have the same metaphors for time. It only means that the correlation, being universally accessible to human cognition, has a better chance of showing up in a wide range of languages than a correlation that is not so universal. And indeed, it seems extremely pervasive cross-linguistically.³⁷ The data so far gathered on Aymara (spoken on the high plateaus of the Andes) support a PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO and FUTURE IS BEHIND EGO metaphorical model in that language (Núñez and Sweetser, 2001). The Aymara model is apparently based on the KNOWN IS SEEN, UNKNOWN IS UNSEEN correlates of the KNOWLEDGE IS VISION metaphor (see Sweetser, 1990: ch. 2); we can see what is in front of us, not what is behind us, and we know things about the past but not about the future.³⁸ This is fascinating, but still stands against a background of the salient cross-cultural frequency of the FUTURE IS AHEAD OF EGO model; although other models often coexist with it (e.g. in Chinese, PAST IS UP and FUTURE IS DOWN coexist with the front-back model), we nonetheless have to look far to find a language which does not build its models of time at least partly on the basis of the correlations between time and space involved in moving along a path.

Similarly, Evans and Wilkins (1998) argue that some Australian languages base their metaphors for cognition primarily on hearing, rather than on vision. This is fascinating, and shows clearly that even an extremely basic experiential correlation, such as that between vision and knowledge,³⁹ is rarely the *only* possible correlation which can be exploited for categorization or metaphorical mapping. It surely does not undermine another important point, namely that the basic nature of the correlation between vision and cognitive intake must be the reason why KNOWLEDGE IS VISION is not merely common but pervasive in the world's languages; in twenty years of discussing this metaphor in front of linguistic audiences, I have elicited only a longer and longer list of corroborating examples for the cross-linguistic importance of this mapping, with the sole exception of the Australian data.

So there are some very general correlations between the structure of the human body and the vertical and horizontal dimensions of its environment, and these correlations are unlikely to be irrelevant to broader human conceptual structure. As we can see, English speakers are far from being stuck in one single model for talking about Self or Society. What is of interest here is not so much the question of how likely these specific models are to be universal, but rather the ease with which they co-align to form a coherent multi-dimensional cluster of metaphors. Although it might be wrong to refer to this cluster as a single complex model, clearly it can act as such at least sometimes; Portia's *suburbs of your good pleasure* is such a case.

Equally clear is the fact that – despite all the cultural differences between Elizabethan England and the modern English-speaking world, and all the unknowability of Shakespeare's cognitive processes – the co-aligned

metaphor cluster analysed in this essay is as characteristic of Shakespeare's language as it is of my own. It is not necessarily equally present to both communities of speakers in the specific word *suburbs*, of course: a modern experience of suburbs would be only one of peripherality, and not lower elevation. But in approaching older texts, we necessarily triangulate between different routes of access; and we can never entirely eliminate our own cultural understandings from the tools we are using to understand other cultural systems. In this case, they stand us in good stead – combined, of course, with all the more specific knowledge about Shakespeare's culture, language and texts which we can bring to bear.

At an early presentation of this material, a critical theorist colleague commented that metaphorical analyses such as this one might prove very useful in teaching Shakespeare to contemporary students. On consideration, this seems right to me; one might assist students in approaching older texts, by focusing on areas where those texts make deep and pervasive use of metaphors which the students themselves use every day.

By the same token, it seems necessary to express caution about such analyses' use for fuller, deeper understanding of older texts. We may find it easier to analyse in detail metaphorical systems with which we are ourselves familiar. On the other hand, we may glory in Difference and fail to be interested in the familiar and obvious aspects of an older text. Proper balance between these two tendencies is surely as important in literary analysis as in any other examination of culture, given that we can never just experience Shakespeare as Elizabethan readers. The question of how much of our own cognitive structure it is legitimate to take with us in reading Shakespeare seems as central, and as hard to resolve, as the same question when posed with respect to anthropological analysis of other cultures. And the two questions, seen side-by-side, may illuminate each other: cognitive and linguistic structures which do turn out to be good candidates for universals are also of course likely candidates for stable areas in our assumptions about earlier periods of our own culture's history, while areas where we see major differences between our cognitive models and those of Renaissance English speakers are unlikely areas for cross-cultural uniformity.

In short, our neural systems shape and constrain the kinds of conceptual structures we can have; but they are complex and flexible enough to allow a great deal of variation, both cross-culturally and also in permitting individuals many alternative models of any given complex domain. Truly great makers of texts (and Shakespeare surely was one) exploit both the universal and the culture-specific in their worldviews. Freeman (1993) has shown that specific bodily image schematic structures play a crucial and recurring thematic role in *King Lear* and in others of Shakespeare's tragedies. In this instance from *Julius Caesar*, Shakespeare built a complicated and evidently culturally

specific model: walled cities and suburbs, or monarchical nations, as models of selves or social structures cannot be universals, since the walled cities and monarchies themselves are not. But throughout the play he also fully and creatively exploited the deep – perhaps even universal – underlying and correlated mappings between our ideas of Self and society and our understanding of our body's structure and its relation to the space around it.

NOTES

1. Naturally, special historical knowledge of language and culture is needed to read Shakespeare seriously; and the texts which moderns appreciate are edited, and inevitably cut for production. The point remains; with the same potential 'filtering' of editing and production, do his contemporaries – or do nearer playwrights such as Restoration ones – have the same richness of appeal?
2. I shall only once request readers' forbearance in reading a linguist's analysis of a text which is central to the literary scholarly canon. I believe cognitive linguistics has tools to offer literary analysis, and hope this paper will exemplify productive conjunction of literary and linguistic analyses of metaphor. However, I am fully aware that in approaching such a well-examined text, linguists can at most add motivation to perceptions which must have occurred to previous analytic readers. I hope that the linguistic analysis itself, which is not limited to the literary work, will justify my efforts here – and of course, thereby reinforce Turner's (1987, 1991, 1996) reminders to linguists of the need to examine literary metaphor.
3. 'Down and out' was probably originally a boxing phrase, 'down' meaning physically fallen, and 'out' outside the ropes, or perhaps 'out' of contention. Though most modern English speakers have no access to this boxing sense, the phrase remains highly coherent with our language at large.
4. Our understanding of the structure of the outside world (in particular, the earth) would be more likely to pair up with DOWN (cf. caves, mines and holes in general).
5. For other discussion of metaphors of selfhood, especially multiple internal Selves, see Lakoff (1996) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999; chs 12 and 13); the latter makes use of an earlier unpublished version of the present work.
6. A further elaboration of the model apparently capitalizes on the STABILITY of these essential parts of Self, modelling the self as a solar system or some other rotating structure, with a motionless and stable centre and a moving (less stable) periphery. His existence/life REVOLVES around his children. Note that we can also say 'his WORLD' here: further investigation of the relationship of Self, life and world is clearly indicated.
7. A series of concentric containers, in fact?
8. An American colloquialism referring to the unacknowledged prejudices and 'old-boy' relationships which have made women's promotion to the highest corporate status lag behind their access to lower and middle-level corporate positions, even in firms which publicly espouse gender equity. The transparency (invisibility) of glass maps onto the imperceptible nature of the social resistance encountered, while the visibility of the area on the other side of a glass barrier maps onto the *apparent* accessibility of the higher levels.

9. An 'intrusive' questioner is one who crosses such a psychological boundary. Our response may be 'defensive'.
10. And the efficacy of human morality, for ill and for good, is ever-present in little things, as when Brutus berates Cassius for defending a dishonest subordinate (and possibly for his own dishonesty) by saying that Cassius' name - his status and reputation - give moral acceptance to these actions (4.3.1-16). Not only morality, but moral *responsibility* for the results of one's actions, is Brutus' point.
11. Commentators have noted Caesar's likeness to Elizabeth in lacking offspring as direct heirs. At the time of *Julius Caesar's* writings, Elizabeth was old and had been threatened by assassination plots: her cousin James of Scotland eventually succeeded her peacefully, but during her lifetime everyone feared civil war at her death.
12. See 5.1.51ff., and also the later scene where Octavius, Antony and Lepidus cold-bloodedly follow up the mob murder Antony incited with a series of political executions, bargaining among themselves as if the lives were so much currency. Brutus, by contrast, refuses to extend the murder plot beyond Caesar to Antony or others, and prevents the conspirators from doing so.
13. Educated viewers, of course, knew that it had not ended at all; the new contenders would be Antony and Octavius, whose conflicting ambitions are here presaged in their competition for precedence (5.1.16-20).
14. One could well argue that the model of marriage evoked is (unsurprisingly) an Elizabethan Christian one rather than a Roman one. But this is not essential to my argument.
15. For a treatment of the Marriage as Union metaphor in modern American culture, see Quinn (1987).
16. Just so the goddess Athene, representing thought and rationality, more successfully reproves Achilles in Book I of the *Iliad* (unseen by his interlocutors), keeping him from trying to murder Agamemnon in a rage. Homer calls her a goddess; a modern reader might call her Achilles' common sense, gaining control of his fury.
17. In 2.2.237-8 she says that he has 'ungently stole from my bed'; and in 2.46-7 she describes him angrily waving her away from him without speaking to her.
18. And another feminine Latin noun, *fortitudo*.
19. Love, which as Chaucer's Prioress reminds us (*Canterbury Tales*, Prologue, l. 162), 'conquers all'. (*Amor vincit omnia*).
20. We could go on forever about the relationship of our moral system to barriers. Modals are partially formulated in terms of barriers, especially modals of permission (Sweetser, 1990). Laws are barriers to illegal actions. An *outlaw* is a person excluded from the social structure by legal strictures, because of a heinous crime.
21. Portia says 'Brutus is wise' in 2.1.258; everyone agrees in calling him honourable, from Antony's ironic usage in his speech over Caesar's body (3.2.74ff.) to the serious eulogy at the end of the play (5.5.68ff.).
22. As Cassius reminds Brutus later (5.1.45), if Brutus had been more concerned for his own safety (rather than for morality and humanity) and had agreed to kill Antony, the conspirators might not have faced ultimate defeat at the Triumvirate's hands.
23. Or at any rate, in any relationship between conventional morality and goodness; Ford's incestuous lovers, Annabella and her brother, are far more sympathetic people, and otherwise better human beings, than the 'good' characters who victimize them and each other.
24. See, for example, Rosch (1977), Mervis and Rosch (1981) and the useful general work of Taylor (1989).

25. Berlin and Kay (1969); Kay and McDaniel (1978), Hardin and Maffi (1997) give an update on colour category scholarship
26. Cf. Bloom *et al.* (1996).
27. Clark (1973) brought this mapping, and its experiential basis, to the cognitive linguistic community's attention. Cf. Núñez (1999) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999: ch. 9); see Moore (1997) for a discussion of spatial metaphors for time in English and Wolof.
28. One might compare the Aymara model with the use of *behind* with future meaning in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, 1.3.117. Macbeth has just heard that the witches' two lesser prophecies have been fulfilled: he is now Thane of Glamis and Thane of Cawdor. Referring to their other prophecy, that he will be king, he now says, 'The greatest is behind.' He means that the greatest is yet to come, and will follow. However, this usage still clearly means that the greatest is future relative to the other less great events, and hence behind *them*. This EVENT-centred model, as opposed to an EGO-centred model, exists in English and in many other languages, usually alongside the EGO-centred model. What is unusual in Aymara, if Núñez and Sweetser are correct, is that it has an EGO-centred model which reverses the directional mappings more usually found.
29. Cf. Johnson (in press).

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APPENDIX

Julius Caesar, 2.1.233–309

(Enter Portia)

Portia

Brutus, my lord.

Brutus

Portia, what mean you? Wherefore rise you now?
It is not for your health thus to commit
Your weak condition to the raw cold morning.

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Portia

Nor for yours neither. Y have ungently, Brutus,
Stole from my bed; and yesternight at supper
You suddenly arose and walked about,
Musing and sighing, with your arms across;
And when I asked you what the matter was,
You stared upon me with ungentle looks.
I urged you further; then you scratched your head,
I and too impatiently stamped with your foot.

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Brutus

I am not well in health, and that is all.

Portia

Brutus is wise and, were he not in health,
He would embrace the means to come by it.

Brutus

Why, so I do. Good Portia, go to bed.

260

Portia

Is Brutus sick, and is it physical
To walk unbraced and suck up the humors
Of the dank morning? What, is Brutus sick,

And will he steal out of his wholesome bed,
 To dare the vile contagion of the night,
 And tempt the rheumy and unpurged air
 To add unto his sickness? No, my Brutus;
 You have some sick offense within your mind,
 Which by the right and virtue of my place
 I ought to know of; and upon my knees
 I charm you, by my once commended beauty,
 By all your vows of love, and that great vow
 Which did incorporate and make us one,
 That you unfold to me, your self, your half,
 Why you are heavy, and what men tonight
 Have had resort to you; for here have been
 Some six or seven, who did hide their faces
 Even from darkness.

Brutus

Kneel not, gentle Portia.

Portia

I should not need, if you were gentle Brutus.
 Within the bond of marriage, tell me, Brutus,
 Is it excepted I should know no secrets
 That appertain to you? Am I your self
 But, as it were, in sort or limitation,
 To keep with you at meals, comfort your bed,
 And talk to you sometimes? Dwell I but in the suburbs
 Of your good pleasure? If it be no more,
 Portia is Brutus' harlot, not his wife.

Brutus

You are my true and honorable wife,
 As dear to me as are the ruddy drops
 That visit my sad heart.

Portia

If this were true, then I should know this secret.
 I grant I am a woman; but withal
 A woman that Lord Brutus took to wife.
 I grant I am a woman; but withal
 A woman well reputed, Cato's daughter.
 Think you I am no stronger than my sex,
 Being so fathered and so husbanded?
 Tell me your counsels, I will not disclose 'em.
 I have made strong proof of my constancy,
 Giving myself a voluntary wound
 Here in the thigh; can I bear that with patience,
 And not my husband's secrets?

Brutus

O ye gods,
 Render me worthy of this noble wife!

(Knock.)

Hark, hark! One knocks. Portia, go in a while,
 And by and by thy bosom shall partake
 The secrets of my heart.

All my engagements I will construe to thee,
 All the character of my sad brows.
 Leave me with haste.

(Exit Portia)